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Attorney Accountability in Kentucky-
Liability to Clients and Third Parties
By GERALD P. JOHNSTON*
INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, decisions in Kentucky' and
throughout this country2 have held attorneys liable to former
clients for professional negligence. In fact, one of the earliest re-
ported attorney malpractice decisions in the United States is Ken-
tucky's first such case, Eccles v. Stephenson. 3However, until the
1960s the prevailing judicial attitude in legal malpractice suits
was one of protectionism toward the legal profession. 4 That atti-
tude has now changed as courts in the past twenty years have
overturned age-old barriers which had long discouraged the suc-
cessful pursuit of such suits.5 During this period of rapid and dra-
Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1959, Wesleyan Univer-
sity; L L.B. 1962, Duke University. The author was a former associate (1962-63) in the
Los Angeles firm of O'Melveny & Myers and an associate (1963-68) and a partner (1969-
78) in the Washington, D.C. office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
1 Moreheads Trustee v. Anderson, 100 S.W. 340 (Ky. 1907); Hey v. Simon, 93
S.W. 50 (Ky. 1906); Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v. Ducker's Ex'x, 64 S.W. 671 (Ky. 1901); An-
derson's Adm'r v. Conklin, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (Abstract) 183 (Grayson Super. Ct. 1889);
McArthur v. Baker, 7 Ky. Law Rep. (Abstract) 440 (Campbell Cir. Ct. 1885); Baker v.
McArthur, 5 Ky. Law Rep. (Abstract) 185 (Campbell Super. Ct. 1883); Eccles v. Stephen-
son, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 517 (1814).
2 Stephens v. White, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 203 (1796), is the first reported legal malprac-
tice case in this country. For examples of comparable early decisions in other jurisdictions,
see Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857); Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900 (Cal.
1895); Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435 (1868); Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (o.s.) 353
(La. 1821). However, legal malpractice actions date back even further in England. See,
e.g., Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767). For an excellent summary of the history
of legal malpractice as a cause of action, see Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negli-
gence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 755-58 (1959).
a 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 517 (1814).
4 See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Goodman & Mitchell v.
Walker, 30 Ala. at 482; Rose v. Davis, 157 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 1941); Hey v. Simon, 93 S.W.
at 50; Anderson's Adm'r v. Conklin, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (Abstract) at 183; Baker v. McAr-
thur, 5 Ky. Law Rep. (Abstract) at 185; Babbitt v. Bumpus, 41 N.W. 417, 419 (Mich.
1889); Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1954). See Wade, supra note 2; Note, Attor-
ney Malpractice, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 1292 (1963).
5 In 1958 and 1961, the California Supreme Court overturned the long-standing
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matic transformation, 6 the number of malpractice claims esca-
lated at a hectic rate.7 While the courts in Kentucky have not
been on the cutting edge of these developments in the legal mal-
practice area, they have made startling expansions of liability in
malicious prosecution actions brought against lawyers. Overall,
Kentucky courts have established an increasingly favorable cli-
mate for claimants in attorney accountability actions.
This Article will review significant national trends which are
occurring in the two major areas of attorney liability: (1) liability
to clients for legal malpractice and (2) liability to third persons
for malicious prosecution. Kentucky decisions will be analyzed
and compared with nationwide developments throughout the
discussion.
privity rule which had protected attorneys from suits by any person other than their im-
mediate clients. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P. 2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962) (allowing beneficiaries under a will to sue the testator's attorney for negligent will
preparation); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) (balancing various factors such
as forseeability of harm and degree of injury to the third party). In 1969, two decisions
held that the statute of limitations does not necessarily start to run at the date of the negli-
gent act or omission in a legal malpractice case, but may be extended by other consider-
ations such as when the claimants discovered or should have discovered the attorney's neg-
ligence. Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 166 (Cal. 1969); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley &
Price, 255 A.2d 359, 367 (Md. 1969).
6 For a discussion of these developments on a national level, see R. MALLEN & V.
LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6 (2d ed. 1981); Avery, Significant Current Trends Affect-
ing Malpractice Liability of Lawyers in the Fields of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law, 13 REAL PROP. PaOB. & Ta. J. 574 (1978); Zilly, Recent Developments in Legal Mal-
practice Litigation, 16 LITIGATION 8 (Fall 1979).
7 According to the Wall Street Journal, clients are suing their lawyers more than
twice as frequently as a decade ago. Flanagan, Malpractice Suits, Fueled by Recession,
Spell Boom Timesfor Sellers of Liability Insurance, Wall St., J., June 23, 1980, at 48, col.
2. The rapid rise in malpractice claims also is reflected in the substantial increase in mal-
practice insurance premiums that generally occurred in the 1970s. See Bridgman, Legal
Malpractice-A Consideration of the Elements of a Strong Plaintiffs Case, 30 S.C.L.
REv. 213, 216 n. 10 (1979); Sheehan, The History of Lawyers' Professional Liability Insur-
ance, 13 FORUM 808, 812-14 (1977-78); Stern, Legal Malpractice Part I-Are You Really
Protected By Your Malpractice Policy?, 14 TRIAL 23 (Dec. 1978); Cost of Malpractice In-
surance Is Now a Concernfor Lawyers, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 44, col. 1.
The rise in malpractice litigation, and the increasing attention paid it by attor-
neys, are evidenced by the fact that during a 30-month period from January 1975 through
June 1977, 22 law review articles and nine books were published on legal malpractice, and
the fact that six separate programs on attorney malpractice were presented at a single con-
vention of the American Bar Association at its national meeting in 1977. Avery, supra note
6, at 574-75.
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I. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. Attorney-Client Relationship
A cause of action for legal malpractice is generally founded
on the attorney-client relationship and the responsibilities that
arise from that relationship." While it usually is not necessary to
categorize a malpractice action as founded on tort or breach of
contract, 9 it is important for a claimant to establish the existence
of a duty to exercise reasonable care owed by the attorney to the
claimant.10 This issue can arise both at the start and end of the at-
torney-client relationship. If the attorney can show that no such
relationship ever came into existence, then no duty is owed the
claimant, and the attorney, for example, cannot be held liable
for not filing suit within the limitations period." However, no
particular formality is required, and courts are clearly inclined to
find that a sufficient relationship existed so as to place on the at-
torney the duty to act reasonably to protect the other party's in-
terest. 12 For example, a lawyer's initial investigation of a matter,
8 See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 101 at 171.
9 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d at 689; Comment, New Developments in
Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 408, 436-41 (1977). Classification of a legal mal-
practice suit as based upon tort or contract may still have some significance in jurisdictions
which do not have a separate statute of limitations specifically applicable to legal mal-
practice actions. In these jurisdictions, casting the malpractice claim in terms of a contrac-
tual cause of action might extend the time for filing suit, since the limitations period for
breach of contract generally is longer than for a cause of action in tort. See, e.g., Hillhouse
v. McDowell, 410 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1966) (cause of action for attorney malpractice gov-
erned by six-year statute of limitations relating to contracts, not one-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injury). See also Foulks v. Falls, 91 Ind. 315 (1883); Bland v. Smith, 277
S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1955); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 288 P. 265 (Wash. 1930).
The Kentucky legislature in 1980 adopted a new separate statute of limitations for
civil actions arising out of the rendition of "professional services." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
413.245 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. A companion provision
defines "professional services" to include the practice of law. KRS § 413.243 (Supp. 1980).
10 See, e.g., Eccles v. Stephenson, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) at 517; Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v.
Ducker's Ex'x, 64 S.W. at 671. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 101.
n See, e.g., Brandlin v. Belcher, 134 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1977), where the court
held that the attorney, who had previously represented the deceased in a divorce action,
had not entered into an attorney-client relationship with her in regard to the amendment
of an inter vivios trust, and was therefore not liable to the beneficiaries for failure to
amend the trust.
12 See, e.g., Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70
without a clear-cut retention of his or her services, has generally
been held sufficient to establish the attorney's duty to the
"cclient ."13
Liability for legal malpractice can also hinge on the issue of
whether the attorney-client relationship has terminated. 14 A
Kentucky decision rendered at the turn of the century, Hey v.
Simon, 15 held that employment of an attorney engaged to prose-
cute several claims terminated with entry of final judgment, un-
less his services were retained further by the client, even though
the attorney failed to advise the client regarding appeal of the
judgment. It is doubtful that a court would reach the same con-
clusion today under the circumstances of that case."0 Nonethe-
less, an attorney cannot be held liable for acts or omissions when
it is clearly demonstrated that his or her services were no longer
retained.
B. Standard of Care
When a cause of action for legal malpractice was first recog-
nized in England, lawyers apparently were liable only for acts of
gross negligence.17 While there is some trace of this reduced stan-
262 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (even a gratuitous rendition of services gives rise to an attorney-client
relationship); Alman v. Winkelman, 106 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1939) (no fee necessary for
creation of the relationship); Quaglino v. Quaglino, 152 Cal. Rptr. 47 (Ct. App. 1979) (no
particular formality needed); Neville v. Davinroy, 355 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)
(legal advice over several years by an attorney to a friend held to create attorney-client re-
lationship).
13 In Tormo v. Yormack, 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975), the court held that an at-
torney's agreement "to see what could be done with regard to settlement" and then advise
an individual as to whether he would accept the case was sufficient to create an attorney-
client relationship during the pendency of the "inquiry." Id. at 1166.
14 In Ohlman v. Ohlman, 212 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973), for example, the
court held that an attorney-client relationship generally terminates when the purpose of
the employment has been accomplished by the attorney.
15 93 S.W. at 50.
16 See the cases cited in notes 12 and 13supra for a discussion of situations held to es-
tablish an attorney-client relationship. In Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978), for example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals bent over backwards to protect
the client where there was a substantial question as to the scope of the attorney's retention,
because a layperson is unskilled in the law and thus may be incapable of protecting his or
her own interests.
17 For a discussion of the early English legal malpractice tort, see Humboldt Bldg.
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dard in the early cases decided in this country,'8 the rule quickly
evolved that an attorney was liable for any failure to exercise the
skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by others in the profes-
sion. 19 Although the precise wording may vary from state to
state, and even from decision to decision within a single jurisdic-
tion, legal malpractice cases are now governed by a general stan-
dard, modified to incorporate the level of competency of others
similarly engaged in the practice of law. Thus, lawyers, as mem-
bers of a learned profession, are not held to a reasonable person
standard as such, but are held to a higher standard based upon
the reasonable conduct of others practicing the same profession.2
Kentucky's highest court in Humboldt Building Ass'n v.
Ducker's Ex'x,2' decided more than eighty years ago, summarized
the standard of care in legal malpractice cases in a manner that is
still generally applicable today: "[A]n attorney is liable for the
want of such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profes-
sion commonly possess and exercise in such matters of profession-
al employment."2
1. Mistakes in Judgment
The Humboldt opinion points out, however, that a lawyer
generally is not liable for a "mistake in judgment."' 3 Characteriz-
ing acts or omissions as "mistakes in judgment" has been an effec-
tive shield against malpractice claims,2 but in the past decade a
number of cases have narrowed the scope of its use, at least in
Ass'n v. Ducker's Ex'x, 64 S.W. at 672; R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 5.
18 See e.g., Suydam v. Vance, 23 F. Cas. 477 (C.C.N.D. Ind. 1820) (No. 13,657);
Pennington's Ex'rs v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212 (1850); Holmes v. Peck, 1 R.I. 242 (1849).
19 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. at 195; Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v. Ducker's Ex'x,
64 S.W. at 671.
20 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Tors, § 32, at 161-62 (4th ed. 1971); R.
MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, §§ 250-51, at 315, 318.
21 64 S.W. at 671.
22 Id. at 672-73.
23 Id. at 671.
2 See, e.g., Martin v. Burns, 429 P.2d 660, 662 (Ariz. 1967); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 41
N.W. at 418-19; Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d at 146; Hill v. Mynatt, 59 S.W. 163, 166-67
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1900). See generally Mallen & Evans, Attorneys' Liability for Errors of
Judgment-At the Crossroads, 48 TENN. L. REv. 283 (1981).
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non-litigation settings. For example, in Smith v. Lewis,2 a client
sued the lawyer who had represented her in an earlier divorce for
his failure to assert that she had a community property interest in
her husband's National Guard retirement benefits. The attorney
argued that the law was so unclear with regard to classification
of such retirement benefits that the exercise of his judgment in
advising his client that her husband's benefits were not commu-
nity property should not be subject to question.2 6 In affirming a
$100,000 jury verdict against the attorney, the California Su-
preme Court held:
With respect to an unsettled area of the law, ... an attorney
assumes an obligation to his client to undertake reasonable re-
search in an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to
make an informed decision as to a course of conduct based
upon an intelligent assessment of the problem ....
In contrast to Smith, the courts are still inclined to give attor-
neys broad latitude in making tactical decisions during the course
of actual litigation. 8 Yet, none of the courts in this country has
gone as far as the judiciary in England and several other common
law countries, where trial attorneys are held to be absolutely im-
mune from malpractice claims arising out of the conduct of lit-
igation.21
Two recent cases illustrate the broader leeway granted attor-
neys in this country for judgments made during litigation. In the
first case, Strictlan v. Koella,30 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
25 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975).
2 Id. at 591.
27 Id. at 595.
28 See, e.g., Prawer v. Essling, 282 N.W. 2d 493 (Minn. 1979); Sanders v. Smith,
496 P.2d 1102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966). See also C. KINDRECAN, MALPRACTICE AND THE LAWYER 16 (rev. ed. 1981); R. MAL-
LEN & V. LEvT, supra note 6, § 578; Mallen & Evans, supra note 24 at 308-12.
This judicial inclination is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that in every lit-
igated case, there is a winner and a loser, and in view of the outcome, it is not unusual for
a client who lost to be critical of the attorney's performance. Thus, as a consequence of the
very nature of the litigation process, an attorney engaged in litigation is considered to be
entitled to additional protection against malpractice claims.
29 For a discussion of the law in England, New Zealand and Canada, see Stricklan v.
Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 813-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); C. KINDRECAN, supra note 28, at
51.
30 546 S.W.2d at 810.
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held that an attorney was not liable for refusing to use trial tac-
tics that were dictated by the client, such as moving for a change
in venue and filing transcripts of depositions that had been taken
in the case, where such actions would have served no useful pur-
pose. While the court seemed inclined to adopt an absolute rule
precluding malpractice suits when the allegations arise from the
conduct of a case during trial, it settled for a less comprehensive
approach:
We do not hold that there generally is no cause of action
against an attorney for his negligence or malpractice [during
litigation]; we only hold ... there can be no cause of action
against an attorney arising out of the manner in which he hon-
estly chooses to present his client's case to the trier of the
facts. 31
In the second case, also applying Tennessee law, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a professional judgment ex-
ception for claims arising out of litigation tactics, but applied it
more cautiously. In this case, Woodruff v. Tomlin, 32 the defen-
dant-attorney had previously represented the plaintiff in a per-
sonal injury suit brought in state court. The Sixth Circuit con-
strued Strictlan v. Koella as standing for the proposition that a
lawyer is not liable for acts or omissions in conducting litigation
which are based upon an "honest exercise of professional judg-
ment"," and agreed that such a rule was sound in order to avoid
baseless suits by clients who had litigated and lost.3 While up-
holding most of the rulings of the trial court, the court of appeals
did, however, overturn the judgment n.o.v. which had been
granted in the defendant-lawyer's favor as to several of plaintiffs'
claims. These claims included allegations relating to the failure
of the attorney during the prior state court proceeding to inter-
view certain potential witnesses suggested by his clients and to
argue that violation of a Tennessee statute relating to proper op-
eration of a motor vehicle constituted a separate basis of liabil-
ity. 3
31 Id. at 814.
32 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980).
3Id. at 930.34 1d.
35 d. at 933-35.
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No recent Kentucky cases have dealt with so-called "mistakes
in judgment" arising in the trial context. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals' decision in Daugherty v. Runner,36 however, was ren-
dered in an analogous situation. In Daugherty, the estate of a
woman who was seriously injured in an automobile accident and
who died a month later in a hospital brought a malpractice claim
against the attorney it had retained to file suit for personal in-
juries arising out of the accident. The attorney did not bring a
medical malpractice action for the allegedly inadequate treat-
ment the decedent had received as a patient, and that action be-
came barred by the statute of limitations. 37 In the subsequent
legal malpractice action, the attorney claimed that he was em-
ployed only to represent the decedent in connection with the
automobile accident, as reflected by the written retainer agree-
ment . 8 The jury apparently agreed with him. It rendered a ver-
dict for the defendant-attorney, although it also found that if the
medical malpractice suit had been prosecuted, decedent's estate
would have recovered $146,123.75.39
The court grudgingly upheld the jury's verdict, but made it
clear that attorneys owe a duty to their client to investigate the
facts, much as the attorney in Smith v. Lewis was required to re-
search the law4o and not simply exercise his judgment in a
vacuum:
We are not ready to hold that Mr. Runner had absolutely no
duties to his client with regard to a medical malpractice action
simply because the written [employment] contract did not spe-
cifically mention a malpractice suit. To do so would require
the client, presumably a layman who is unskilled in the law, to
recognize for himself all potential legal remedies. An attorney
cannot completely disregard matters coming to his attention
which should reasonably put him on notice that his client may
3 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
37 Id. at 15, 17-18.
'8 The written employment contract provided that Runner was to "institute a claim
for damages against any and all responsible parties as a result of injuries received upon the
22nd day of February, 1972." Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
39 Id.
40 See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the Smith v.
Lewis decision.
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have legal problems or remedies that are not precisely or total-
ly within the scope of the task being performed by the attor-
ney. 41
The decision in Daughtery v. Runner places a heavy burden
upon Kentucky attorneys retained for litigation purposes to un-
dertake a thorough factual investigation and prosecute every pos-
sible cause of action that might be asserted on a client's behalf.
Daugherty arguably sets as high a standard of care as the Califor-
nia Supreme Court established in Smith v. Lewis, where it was
held that an attorney is required to perform a reasonable amount
of research into the state of the law in order properly to exercise
his judgment and advise his client as to an appropriate course of
action. As a consequence, it would seem that little life remains in
the "mistake in judgment" doctrine in Kentucky, except perhaps
in the area of litigation tactics, as illustrated by Strictlan v. Ko-
ella and Woodruff v. Tomlin.
2. The Need for Expert Testimony
The principle issue in a legal malpractice case is whether the
defendant-attorney's conduct met or exceeded the degree of care
and skill expected of a reasonably competent lawyer under the
same circumstances. 'rhis all-important question is generally left
for determination by a jury,42 placing an attorney charged with
malpractice at a distinct disadvantage because jurors do not see
members of the legal profession as particularly sympathetic fig-
ures. 43 Thus, plaintiffs in a malpractice action who can get cases
Smith v. Lewis has been widely regarded as setting a very high standard of care
for attorneys. See Heckerling, Estate Planning Malpractice-What Standard of Care?,
116 TR. & EST. 728, 767 n.37 (1977); Schnidman, The Collateral Effects of Legal Special-
ization On the Applicable Standard of Care As It Relates To A Duty To Consult and Duty
to Advise, 6 OHio N.U.L. Rev. 666 (1979); Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice
Dilemma: Will New Standards of Care Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the
Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. CN. L. REV. 541, 545-47 (1976); Wormser, Interstate Prac-
tice of Estate Planning: Ethics and Malpractice, 11 INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 800, 811 (1977).
41 581 S.W.2d at 17.
4 2 See, e.g., Miller v. Metzinger, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1979); Lipscomb v.
Krause, 151 Cal. Rptr. 465 (Ct. App. 1978); Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d at 12:
Owen v. Neely, 471 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1971); Herston v. Whitesell, 348 So. 2d 1054 (Ala.
1977); Titsworth v. Mondo, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 793 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Hansen v. Wightman, 538
P.2d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
43 Richard D. Bridgman, a California attorney who specializes in plaintiff's tort lit-
1981-82]
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to the jury are likely to be compensated for any loss they may
have suffered, regardless of who was responsible for that loss. 44
Counterbalancing this inherent advantage to some extent is
the fact that plaintiffs in malpractice actions usually must obtain
the expert testimony of an attorney in order to establish the stan-
dard of care applicable to the defendant-attorney and prove that
the defendant's conduct fell short of that standard. 45 This need
for expert testimony parallels the situation in medical malprac-
tice actions, where expert medical testimony is normally re-
quired in order to establish malpractice against a physician. 46 Al-
though only a few cases are directly in point, it is clear that plain-
tiffs who bring a legal malpractice action against an attorney run
a substantial risk of having their case dismissed unless a lawyer
can be retained to serve as an expert witness on their behalf. 47
Because of the need-for expert testimony, a claimant li a
legal malpractice suit must not only find an attorney willing to
igation, has summarized the lawyer-defendant's dilemma this way: "The quantum of ne-
glect that would not result in a verdict against a doctor, nor, for that matter, a bus driver,
may well convince a jury to bring in a verdict against a lawyer. Lawyers are not only poor
witnesses, but unloved witnesses as well." Bridgman, supra note 7, at 216. Other com-
mentators agree that a lawyer in a legal malpractice case is unlikely to get a fair hearing
from a jury. See, e.g., J. GOULDEN, THE MILLION DOLLAR LAWYERS 270 (1978); McCabe,
The Lawyer as Target: Today's Client is Tomorrow's Plaintiff , 48 PA. B. ASs'N Q. 525,531
(1977).
"The lawyer's dilemma should not be overstated, however. In Daugherty v. Run-
ner, for example, the claimant in a legal malpractice action got his case to the jury, which
found for the attorney-defendant, even though its verdict indicated that if the original
medical malpractice suit had been filed within the statute of limitations, the claimant
would have recovered more than $146,000. 581 S.W.2d at 14. For a discussion of this case
and the puzzling verdict returned by the jury, see notes 36-41 and the accompanying text
supra.
45. C. KINDREGAN, supra note 28, at 34-35; R. MALLEN & V. LEVlT. supra note 6, §
665.
46 A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw 60-61 (1975); W. PROSSER, supra note
20, § 32, at 164-65.
47 In Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1975), the claimants, who
had brought suit against their former attorney for his mistakes in checking title to a vessel
which they had subsequently purchased, had their action dismissed when they failed to
produce an expert witness to testify on their behalf that the defendant's conduct fell below
the applicable standard of care for lawyers engaged in such work. Several other cases serve
to illustrate the problems that can be presented if the malpractice claimant does not pro-
duce an attorney at trial who is qualified to testify as an expert witness. See, e.g., Palmer
v. Nissen, 256 F. Supp. 497, 500-01 (D. Me, 1966); Olson v. North, 276 Il. App. 457, 486-
88 (1934); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d at 477-78.
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represent his interests, but also a second lawyer who is both will-
ing and qualified to testify as an expert. Just a decade ago, grave
concern was expressed about the possibility of a "conspiracy of si-
lence" in the legal profession which would preclude successful lit-
igation of malpractice claims against attorneys. 48 In the last few
years, however, innumerable legal malpractice suits have been
filed and prosecuted in virtually every jurisdiction in this coun-
try.49 That is not to say, of course, that a claimant may not still
face some difficulty in retaining the services of an attorney and
locating an expert.5o
In a jurisdiction such as Kentucky, which is not heavily pop-
ulateds' and has less than 8,000 lawyers admitted to practice
within its borders, 52 it may be difficult, particularly in smaller
communities, to retain one attorney to represent a malpractice
claimant and to employ yet another to testify as an expert. Such a
thesis is impossible to prove or disprove, since there is no way of
determining the number of potential claimants who did not as-
48 The so-called "conspiracy of silence" or refusal of physicians to testify in medical
malpractice cases can be an insurmountable barrier to the prosecution of such claims. H.
JACOBS, THE SPECTRE OF MALPRACTICE 25-31 (1978); Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Ap-
plied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REv. 250 (1956); McCoid, The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. Rlv. 549, 631 (1958-59). The possible exis-
tence of a similar "conspiracy" in the legal profession was once thought of as preventing
successful claims for legal malpractice. See, e.g., Haughey, Lawyer's Malpractice: A
Comparative Appraisal, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 888, 904 (1973); Peacock, Legal Malprac-
tice, 1968 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 333, 336; Wade, supra note 2, at 774; Wallach & Kelly, At-
torney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 257, 265-66
(1970).
49 See Bridgman, supra note 7, at 215-16; Gates & Zilly, Legal Malpractice, in PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrTY-A GUIDE FOR A'TORNEYS 311, 311 (1978); McCarthy, Insur-
ance Aspects of Legal Malpractice, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS: THE
MALPRACTICE QUESTION 50, 59-63 (1979); Scott, Lawyers Who Sue Lawyers, N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 76; Siegel, Legal Malpractice, Baltimore Sun, Jun. 10,
1982 (Magazine), at 7.
50 R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, at § 254 at 333.
51 According to the 1970 United States Census, Kentucky has an average of 81.2 per-
sons per square mile as compared to a national average of 57.5 persons per square mile.
More densely populated states include New York with 381.3 persons per square mile, Ohio
with 260.0 persons per square mile and California with 127.6 persons per square mile.
1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, vol. 1, part 1, § 1, table 11 (1973).52 According to Bette K. Wilson of the Kentucky Bar Association and managing ed-
itor of the Kentucky Bench and Bar, approximately 7,890 lawyers are admitted to practice
in Kentucky. Telephone interview (June 3, 1982).
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sert their claims because they could not find attorneys willing to
handle their cases or expert witnesses to testify on their behalf.-
But two recent cases in Kentucky indicate that it may not be as
difficult to prosecute suits against attorneys as many in the legal
profession may have believed.
The first case, Daugherty v. Runner,54 focused on whether an
attorney was guilty of malpractice for failing to file a medical
malpractice claim on behalf of his client, even though the terms
of the retainer agreement appeared to limit the representation to
matters relating to injuries sustained in a motor vehicle acci-
dent.- Not only was the plaintiff able to find one lawyer to lit-
igate the legal malpractice claim, but also another lawyer56 who
testified at trial that the defendant-attorney's failure to inquire
into his client's cause of death and his failure to review the hospi-
tal records "was not consistent with good legal practice and, in
fact, was a substantial departure therefrom." 57 It is one thing for
an attorney to serve as an expert witness in an obvious case of
professional negligence, such as where a title search failed to un-
cover a plainly recorded prior lien, 4 but the malpractice issue in
Daugherty was anything but clear-cut. If indeed a widespread
"conspiracy of silence" exists in legal malpractice, one would ex-
pect to see evidence of its existence in a case like Daugherty,
where the defendant-attorney's conduct was not shocking, clear-
ly unethical, or otherwise indicative of gross incompetence.
53 The difficulty in locating reliable information even with regard to those malprac-
tice claims that have been filed is the subject of two excellent articles. See Pfennigstorf,
Types and Causes of Lawyers' Professional Liability Claims: The Search for Facts, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 255; Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82
YALE L.J. 590 (1973).
54 581 S.W.2d at 12.
' Id. at 14, 17-18.
56 The defendant-attorney practiced in Louisville, Kentucky, and the legal malprac-
tice claim was tried before the Jefferson County Circuit Court located there. The court of
appeals' decision, in referring to the expert testimony offered in favor of the claimant in
the legal malpractice suit, described the expert as a "local lawyer," meaning, presumably,
that he also practiced in the Louisville area. Id. at 17-18.
57 Id.
58 There are several legal malpractice decisions in Kentucky where an attorney has
been sued for negligently examining title to real property. See, e.g., Owen v. Neely, 471
S.W.2d at 705; Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v. Ducker's Ex'x, 64 S.W. at 671; Morehead's Trus-
teev. Anderson, 100 S.W. at 340 (dicta).
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Another recent Kentucky case also highlights this point.
Raine v. Drasin59 was a malicious prosecution "countersuit"
brought by two physicians who had been named as defendants in
a prior medical malpractice lawsuit. Not only did the doctors
succeed in retaining an attorney to represent them, but they also
found another lawyer who testified as an expert on their behalf
that the defendant-attorneys "did not comply with the standard
of care for ordinary and prudent lawyers."0 This evidence was
held to be material to the issue of "probable cause" in the mali-
cious prosecution proceeding.61 The attorneys' conduct in nam-
ing the two physicians as defendants in the medical malpractice
action was clearly unjustified 2 but, still, if "a conspiracy of si-
lence" existed among Kentucky lawyers, one would expect to
find some evidence of it in this suit which sought and recovered
punitive damages. 3
It thus appears that lawyers in this state should not rely too
much upon the unwillingness of their colleagues at the bar to
represent legal malpractice claimants or to testify as experts in
such cases. It undoubtedly is true that the necessity of locating
not one but at least two attorneys serves as a damper to prosecu-
tion of such claims. However, even where a lawyer from the
same city or county cannot be secured to serve as plaintiffs ex-
pert witness, an attorney from another jurisdiction might be
found for that purpose. 6
59 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981).
ro Id. at 901. The expert witness in Raine v. Drasin was identified as Professor David
Leibson, a member of the Ethics Committee of the Louisville Bar Association. Id. at 900-
01.
61 Id. at 901.
62 The underlying suit was filed initially against the hospital where the claimant's
shoulder was fractured during treatment for a heart attack. Eight months after the orig-
inal complaint had been filed, the attorneys for the plaintiff filed an amended complaint
joining Drs. Drasin and Fadel as defendants. Both physicians had been brought into the
case after claimant's shoulder had been injured. Fadel, an orthopedic surgeon, was called
in to treat the shoulder, and Drasin, a radiologist, read the x-rays. Furthermore, answers
to interrogatories and testimony at a deposition, both of which occurred prior to the filing
of the amended complaint, revealed that neither physician had been contacted until after
the shoulder had been fractured. Id. at 898.
6 The original malicious prosecution complaint in Raine v. Drasin sought both com-
pensatory and punitive damages against the two attorneys. In fact, $30,000 of the total of
$50,000 awarded the doctors by the jury was allocated to punitive damages. Id.
64 In the Tennessee case of Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. at 1284, the plaintiff
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3. Higher Standardfor Specialists
Commentators have long predicted that an attorney who
specializes in an area and who commits a mistake or error in his
or her specialty will be held to a higher standard of care based
upon the degree of skill and knowledge of other attorneys also
specializing in such field.65 To date, however, only a few cases
have focused on this issue. The first was Wright v. Williams,6
where an attorney made a mistake in checking title to a vessel
which the plaintiffs planned to buy. Because of the error, the
ship which was purchased could not be utilized for its intended
purpose, and the purchasers subsequently brought a malpractice
action against the attorney who verified the title.67 At trial, the
used an Arizona attorney as an expert witness who testified against the defendant-lawyers
as to how they should have investigated and tried the original personal injury suit. In
Walker v. Bangs, 601 P.2d 1279 (Wash. 1979), the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's decision to allow a visiting law professor to serve as an expert witness for the
plaintiff in a legal malpractice action because of his experience in maritime personal in-
jury suits, even though he was not admitted to practice law in that state. And in a multi-
million dollar malpractice suit brought against a well-known plaintiffs lawyer in Toledo,
Ohio, plaintiffs counsel admitted that he had some difficulty finding a lawyer in Toledo
willing to testify, but then used a Cleveland attorney as an expert witness on plaintiffs be-
half. Tybor, $2MAwardedfor Legal Malpractice, NATL L.J., May 26, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
65 See, e.g., Wade, supra note 2, at 776; Note, supra note 7, at 1302-04; Note, Stan-
dard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 787-88 (1967-68). See also 2 RErATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment d (1965).
In medical malpractice cases, it is a widely accepted principle that a physician
who is a specialist in a particular area of medicine is held to a higher standard of care
based upon the level of competence of other doctors specializing in the same field of med-
icine. See, e.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Karp v. Cooley,
493 F.2d 408, 410 (5th Cir. 1974); Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 383 (Ct. App.
1971); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Ky. 1980); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d
370, 373 (Ky. 1970); Halligan v. Cotton, 227 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Neb. 1975); Parkv. Chessin,
387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 211 (Sup. Ct. 1976). Such a standard of care, which varies from spe-
cialty to specialty, is relatively easy to apply in a field such as medicine in which there is a
high degree of well-defined specialization, based upon national boards of certification,
and where the fact of such specialization is generally known to patients seeking medical
services. For a summary of medical education, training and the recognized medical spe-
cialties, see 1 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA §§ 1.4-.10 (3d ed. 1981); G. GREENWOOD
& R. FREDERICKSON, SPECIALIZATION IN THE MEDICAL AND LECAL PROFESSIONS 11-47
(1964).
6 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1975).
67 The claimants first consulted an attorney of one of the purchasers, but he con-
cluded the matter was not within an area of his expertise and referred it to the defendant-
attorney, who specialized in maritime law. The second attorney failed to note that the yes-
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plaintiffs failed to offer expert testimony to establish the standard
of care of an attorney specializing in maritime law; the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal in favor of the defen-
dant-attorney because of this failure of proof.68
More directly on point is the recent California Court of Ap-
peals' decision of Home v. Peckham. 9 In Peckham, a general
practitioner set up a short-term trust and the transfer of property
to that trust ultimately proved to be ineffective to shift income
from the donor-parents to the beneficiary-son.70 After paying an
income tax deficiency, the donor-parents brought a malpractice
action against the general practitioner. In affirming a jury ver-
dict against the attorney, the appellate court held that a general
practitioner has a duty to refer such a matter to a tax specialist,
and the failure to do so could, in and of itself, form the founda-
tion of a legal malpractice suit.71 The court in Peckham further
indicated that if a general practitioner undertakes a legal assign-
ment which reasonably should have been referred to a specialist,
and a mistake or error occurs, the general practitioner would be
held to the higher standard of care of the specialist. 72
Such cases could present a serious problem for attorneys
practicing in Kentucky. To the extent that lawyers in this juris-
diction limit their practice to one or two areas of the law, they
will likely be held to the higher standard of care of attorneys spe-
cializing in the same field or fields. Of even greater concern,
sel had once been owned by an alien, which meant that it could not be used by the pur-
chasers for commercial purposes, as intended, because of the provisions of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920. Id. at 196.
68 Id. at 199-200.
6' 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1979).
70 Id. at 718-20.
71 Id. at 720. The jury instruction in question, regarding the duty of a lawyer in gen-
eral practice to refer a specialized matter to an attorney who specializes in the field, was
based upon a medical malpractice form contained in the California Book of Approved
Jury Instructions. Id.
A general practitioner in the medical profession has long been held to have a duty
to refer his patients to specialists where other reasonably competent physicians would have
made such a referral under the circumstances. See, e.g., Simone v. Sabo, 231 P.2d 19, 22
(Cal. 1951) (duty of dentist in general practice to refer patient to specialist); McCoid,
supra note 48, at 597-98; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 953 (1968).
72 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720. The court held that California's recognition of legal special-
ties and the "reality" of specialization justified a jury instruction regarding a higher stan-
dard of care applicable to attorneys when undertaking sophisticated tax work. Id.
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however, is the impact of decisions such as Peckham on general
practitioners whose numbers one would expect to be proportion-
ately higher in a state such as Kentucky. The problem is com-
pounded further by the fact that attorneys practicing in less pop-
ulous communities may find that the duty to refer set out in Peck-
ham cannot be met in many situations where there may be no
other lawyers within reasonable proximity who have greater ex-
pertise in the particular area of law in question."
The fact that there is no case law in Kentucky on the impact
of specialization on the standard of care in legal malpractice does
not provide much solace to the practitioner in this state. Com-
mentators, as well as some courts, have looked to medical mal-
practice cases for precedent, and have followed that precedent to
the letter.74 Thus, the medical malpractice decisions in Ken-
tucky75 form a firm analogy upon which to hold attorneys in this
jurisdiction to the higher standard of care of a specialist when a
case involving that issue is presented to the courts for resolution. 76
73 For example, suppose an individual wanted to explore the possibilities of incorpo-
rating a farm or other family business for estate planning reasons, as suggested in an article
he or she read. See generally Kess & Westlin, Planning for the Farmer and Rancher, Es-
TATE PLANNING GUIDE (CCH) 310-13 (4th ed. 1982). If the area in which the individ-
ual lived was not near any medium-sized or large cities, it is likely that no lawyers in or
near his or her home would be specialists in taxation, business law or estate planning. In
such a case, the possibility of referral is not meaningful because the client may not want to
travel 100 or so miles for an appointment with an attorney who happens to specialize in
the field in question.
74 See Horne v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 714; Joiner, Specialization in the Law?
The Medical Profession Shows the Way, 39 A.B.A. J. 539 (1953); Wade, supra note 2, at
776; Note, supra note 65, at 787-88; Comment, Legal Effects of Attorney Specialization,
30 ALB. L. REv. 282, 283-86 (1966).
75 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d at 141 (board certified internist); Prewitt
v. Higgins, 22 S.W.2d 115 (Ky. 1929) (exodontist).
76 The national trend toward official recognition of legal specialization also un-
doubtedly adds impetus to imposition of a higher standard of care on specialists. To date,
nine states (Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, South
Carolina and Texas) have enacted programs of "certification" or "designation" of fields of
specialization in the law. 28 C.L.E. REG. 115, 115 (June 1982). For a description of the
various types of official plans of specialization and certification, see ZEHNLE, SPECIALIZA-
TION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 20-29 (1975).
This movement toward legal specialization made rapid strides in the mid-1970s.
During the last decade, almost every jurisdiction in this country has considered adoption
of a specialization plan. See ABA Standing Committee on Specialization, State Status Re-
port, in ABA INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 6, at 23-28 (1980). This trend has now slowed
considerably. See Brink, New Era in Specialization, in ABA INFORMATION BULLETIN No.
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In addition, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,7 which permits lawyers to adver-
tise the field or fields in which they practice, or that their prac-
tice is limited to one or more fields, 78 is also likely to raise the
standard of care. If, for instance, a lawyer advertises that his or
her practice is limited to a particular area of the law and subse-
quently commits a mistake or error in handling a client's case
within such area, such a "holding out" of special capability
would in all likelihood result in the application of a standard of
care based upon the performance level expected of other reason-
ably competent lawyers specializing in that particular field. 719
4. Locality Rule
In contrast to medical malpractice,se the geographic area in
6, at 1, 3 (1980), where the Chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Specialization
conceded that there have been substantial setbacks in the movement toward official recog-
nition of legal specialization. For an excellent discussion of the reasons behind this loss of
momentum, see the Arkansas Supreme Court's comments in In re Amendments to the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and Canons of Judicial Ethics, 590 S.W.2d 2 (Ark.
1979).
To the extent that a state recognizes some form of legal specialization, a lawyer
who opts for specialization will undoubtedly be held to a higher standard of care in any
malpractice suit arising out of an error committed while undertaldng a matter within that
field of specialty.
77 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
78 The Code of Professional Responsibility, as amended, permits lawyers to advertise
the field or fields of law that they are engaged in, or to indicate that their practice is
limited to one or more areas. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSEaILITY DR 2-
101(B) (2) & 2-105(A)(2).
79 See Comment, Specialization: The Resulting Standard of Care and Duty to Con-
stlt, 30 BAYLon L. REv. 729, 734-35 (1978); 2 REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 299A
comment d (1965).
80 The "locality rule" has played a major role in medical malpractice decisions. See
McCoid, supra note 48, at 569-75; Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAuL L. REv. 408 (1969). Early medical mal-
practice decisions held the defendant-physician to a standard of care of other doctors prac-
ticing in the same locality. See, e.g., Force v. Gregory, 27 A. 1116, 1116 (Conn. 1893);
Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880); Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557,558-63 (1876);
Huttner v. MacKay, 293 P.2d 766, 769 (Wash. 1956). A "same or similar community" test
was soon substituted for the strict locality rule, however, because of conceris that the stan-
dard of care would be based in some geographic areas upon the practices of only a few
physicians and in order to counteract the "conspiracy of silence" among physicians prac-
ticing in the same locality. See, e.g:, Harvey v. Kellin, 566 P.2d 297, 300-02 (Ariz. 1977);
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which an attorney practices has had little impact to date on the
applicable standard of care in legal malpractice cases.8 Many of
the leading cases define standard of care without reference to the
locality in which the attorney practiced82 Other well-known de-
cisions make only passing reference to the area of the defendant-
attorney's practice in discussing the standard of care, and that as-
pect has generally had little or no effect on the outcome of the
cases.u Thus, with a few exceptions discussed below, the geo-
graphic region in which an attorney practices has not been a sig-
nificant factor in legal malpractice decisions.
Two jurisdictions have specifically adopted a statewide stan-
dard of care in legal malpractice cases, on the grounds that law-
yers are generally required to pass a bar examination to demon-
strate their competence to practice in a given jurisdiction.84
While such a position offers a certain logical, if oversimplified
approach, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of the
Gambill v. Strond, 531 S.W.2d 945, 948-50 (Ark. 1976); Mutschman v. Petry, 189 N.E.
658, 660 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933) (all applying the "same or similar community" test). See
generally McCoid, supra note 48, at 570; Waltz, supra, at 411; Comment, A Review of
the Locality Rule, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 96, 98, 100, 102-03.
Recent medical malpractice decisions have held that the geographic area in which
the defendant-physician practices is just one of a number of factors relevant to determin-
ing the standard of care under the circumstances of a particular case, thus minimizing the
impact of the "same or similar community" test. E.g., Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d at 373;
Douglas v. Bussabarger, 438 P.2d 829, 832-33 (Wash. 1968); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431
P.2d 973, 979 (Wash. 1967). See generally W. PRossEPa, supra note 20, § 32, at 164. Also,
several courts have held doctors certified as specialists by a national board to a national
standard of care. E.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d at 129; Kronkev. Danielson, 499 P.2d
156, 159 (Ariz. 1972); Naccarato v. Grob, 180 N.W.2d 788,791 (Mich. 1970).
81 C. KINDRECAN, supra note 28, at 36-37; R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, §
254; Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 408, 415
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, New Developments]; Comment, Attorney Mal-
practice-A "Greenian"Analysis, 57 NEB. L. Rav. 1003, 1017-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, "Greenian"Analysis].
82 See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. at 199-200; Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d
at 689; Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d at 15-16; Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.W.2d at 146.
83 E.g., Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d at 592 n.3; Olson v. North, 276 IM. App. at 478-
83; Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (La. 1972).
84 Washington and North Dakota have adopted statewide standards. Rolfstad,
Winkjer, Suess, McKennett & Kaiser, P.C. v. Hanson, 221 N.W.2d 734, 737 (N.D. 1974);
Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W. 2d 218, 224-25 (N.D. 1971); Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Claus-
ing, 438 P.2d 865, 866-67 (Wash. 1968); Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d at 1247.
85 It should be noted that physicians, as well as lawyers, are licensed to practice on a
state-by-state basis; yet, there is little indication in medical malpractice cases that a state-
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State of Washington, which initially adopted the statewide rule,
seems to have departed from that standard in a recent case. 8
Several courts appear to have adopted a standard of care
based upon the conduct of lawyers in a particular community in
situations where such an approach makes particular sense be-
cause of the local nature of the substantive issues being lit-
igated.87 Thus, for example, in a suit involving a lawyer's failure
to note a possible defect during a title search, it seems appropri-
ate to judge the attorney's conduct by the standards of the legal
community in which the property is located, since the question of
what constitutes a cloud on title may vary from area to area even
within a state. 8 On the other hand, attorneys practicing in fields
in which federal statutes or causes of action are involved should
be held to a standard which goes beyond state lines, as the nature
of such practice is nationwide in character. 89
To date, there have been no Kentucky cases on the signif-
icance of geographic area in terms of the standard of care appli-
cable in legal malpractice. Here, as in many other aspects of
wide standard of care should be applied. Furthermore, one of the arguments given in
favor of a statewide standard for lawyers-that such lawyers are required to pass bar
examinations on a state-by-state basis-does not apply to the thousands of lawyers ad-
mitted in numerous jurisdictions by reciprocity, without having to take a bar examination
in their new locale. Certainly it would make no sense whatsoever to have two standards in
a given jurisdiction, one for attorneys who passed the bar examination in that state and
another for lawyers admitted on motion after practicing elsewhere.
88 See Walker v. Bangs, 601 P.2d 1279 (Wash. 1979). In Walker, the Washington
Supreme Court decided in favor of allowing a witness to qualify as an expert in a legal
malpractice case, even though the witness was not admitted to practice in that state. It is
true that the malpractice claim related to a Federal maritime personal injury case, and the
proposed expert had considerable experience in another jurisdiction trying such cases. Id.
at 1282-84. The fact remains that the case seems inconsistent with two prior Washington
decisions which clearly establish a statewide standard of care for legal malpractice cases.
See cases cited in note 85supra.
87 See Palmer v. Nissen, 256 F. Supp. at 501 (under applicable county standards, de-
fects in title not considered material); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d
at 82-83 (malpractice in advising children about their rights as forced heirs to take against
their deceased father's will under unique Louisiana state law.)
88 See 256 F. Supp. at 497.
89 See, e.g., Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d at 262
(maritime law); Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 519 (Ct. App. 1976) (Federal
estate and gift taxation); Instrument Sys. Corp. v. Whitman, Ransom & Coulson, 354
N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (Federal tax treatment of"qualified stock option").
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legal malpractice, it is useful to explore the same issue in the con-
text of medical malpractice. At the turn of the century, Ken-
tucky's highest court, in Burk v. Foster,99 departed from the
"'same locality" rule in medical malpractice cases in favor of a
standard based upon "similar communities." 91 This generally re-
mained the law in Kentucky for some seventy years, until Blair v.
Eblen,92 which is one of the leading decisions in this country
holding that "locality" is just one of a number of factors to be
considered in determining whether or not a physician used the
care and skill expected of a reasonably competent physician "act-
ing in the same or similar circumstances." ' 93 In the process, the
court in Eblen made it clear that it was overruling its earlier deci-
sion in Burk v. Foster,94 which it described as an outmoded rule
designed to protect country doctors in 1902.95
By analogy to the medical malpractice cases, it seems likely
that Kentucky courts, when confronted with the issue, will sim-
ilarly hold that a rural or small town lawyer's conduct should not
be compared to a standard based on the care reasonably expected
from other attorneys practicing in the same or similar communi-
ties, but to a broader, more strenuous standard where the impor-
tance of the locality of the defendant-attorney's practice is less
significant. It is hoped, however, that the courts will not blindly
apply the rationale of Blair v. Eblen to similar issues arising in
legal malpractice cases, but will consider whether it is realistic or
desirable to hold all lawyers throughout the state to the same
standard of care, without regard to the obvious differences in
such things as availability of research materials and facilities, op-
portunities to practice in particular fields, availability of other
attorneys for consultation or referral and other practical barriers
which a lawyer practicing in less populous areas must face.96 Fur-
90 69 S.W. 1096 (Ky. 1902).
91 Id. at 1097.
92 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970).
'3 Id. at 373.
94 69 S.W. at 1096.
95 Id.
96 The possibility of a distinction between lawyers practicing in large cities and their
counterparts in less populous areas was first made in Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. at 75,
where the court noted: "[Tihey were country attornies [sic]; and might not, and probably
did not know that this point was settled here above." The argument has been made, rather
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thermore, strong policy considerations favor wide distribution of
attorneys to make legal services readily available to members of
the public living in all regions of the state. 97 Any rule which
would hold rural or small town practitioners to the same stan-
dards as their larger city colleagues might, over an extended
period of time, have the needless effect of discouraging lawyers
from practicing in the less populous areas and leaving the res-
idents of those areas without legal services.
This is not to say that our legal system should sanction local,
substandard legal usages which are clearly contrary to good prac-
tice. A number of decisions already have held that bad customs
in the local legal community, no matter how widespread, cannot
excuse the negligent conduct of a lawyer who followed the prey-
persuasively, that there are vast differences in resources and opportunities for lawyers
based upon the size of the locality where they practice, and that, therefore, it would be in-
herently unfair to hold small town practitioners to the same standard of care as their met-
ropolitan area colleagues. Comment, "Greenian" Analysis, supra note 81, at 1018-19. A
significant number of commentators, however, take the opposite view that rural practi-
tioners should be held to the same standard as their metropolitan counterparts. See, e.g.,
R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 254; Comment, THE LLINOIS Legal Malpractice
Tort: Basic Tenets and Recent Trends, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 427, 443-44; Comment, New
Developments, supra note 81 at 417.
The 1902 decision of Burk v. Foster addressed this issue in a medical malpractice
context, comparing the capabilities of the city practitioner with his rural counterpart and
drew a number of distinctions which, it is submitted, still have considerable merit, if not
in medicine, then for purposes of legal malpractice:
[it may be recognized that the most efficient and talented in the [medical]
profession generally, and very naturally, seek better and more lucrative
fields for employment; that those living in a sparsely settled neighborhood
will not have, in any probability, the experience, the opportunity for acquir-
ing skill by practice in such cases, that comes to the practitioner of medicine
and surgery in the city. It generally follows, then, that the practitioners in
rural localities have not the same degree of skill, or knowledge, or education
that may be found in large cities and populous communities.
69 S.W. at 1097.
97 The president of the New York City Bar Association, Orville H. Schell, has ex-
pressed his concern that 60% to 90% of the public do not receive adequate legal services.
The Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving the Public? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 64, 74 (1974). The American Bar Association's six-year study of legal needs in this
country confirmed Orville Schell's concerns. B. CuRRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUB-
LIC 253-65 (1972). The need for improved delivery of legal services is the genesis behind
such programs as prepaid legal services and legal clinics. See Christensen, Toward Im-
proved Legal Service Delivery: A Look at Four Mechanisms, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 277.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
alent practice in his or her locale.98 Nor, for that matter, should
the collegiality among a small, close knit local bar preclude insti-
tution of legal malpractice suits, since a "same or similar commu-
nity" standard should provide sufficient leeway to permit a
claimant to locate a lawyer from some different area or state to
offer his or her opinion as to the applicable standard of care and
whether the defendant-attorney's conduct fell below that stan-
dard. 99
5. Relationship between Ethics and Malpractice
To establish the applicable standard of care in a legal mal-
practice action, it seems appropriate to look at pertinent ethical
provisions which would govern the same or similar conduct of an
attorney in disciplinary proceedings.l°° The real question here is
not whether the ethical principles have any relevancy, but the
extent to which a violation of such ethical provisions should serve
to establish an attorney's negligence in a private malpractice ac-
tion.
Some decisions still reflect the early judicial attitude that an
attorney's contravention of an ethical rule has no bearing on the
malpractice issue, and thus refuse to admit any evidence relating
to provisions of that jurisdiction's code of professional responsi-
bility. 101 Other courts, reflecting what now appears to be a ma-
jority view, will admit testimony of code infractions as some evi-
98 E.g., Gleason v. Title Guar. Co., 300 F.2d 813, 814 (5th Cir. 1962); Sarti v.
Udall, 369 P.2d 92, 94 (Ariz. 1962); Berman v. Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802,806 (Ga. Ct. App.
1976).
9 For a discussion of the "conspiracy of silence" in the legal profession, see notes 48-
64 and the accompanying text supra.
100 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility attempts to exclude use of its pro-
visions in malpractice litigation. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Prelim-
inary Statement (1969). As the accompanying "Preamble" also makes clear, however, this
Code does govern conduct of lawyers for the benefit of society at large; therefore, by infer-
ence, it would seem that these same provisions should have some application to an attor-
ney's obligation to his or her clients. For a discussion of the relationship between ethics and
legal malpractice, see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, §§ 7-8.
101 See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-83 (N.D. Iowa 1978);
Young v. Hecht, 597 P.2d 682, 687-88 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Hill v. Willnott, 561
S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Nestlerode v. Federal Ins. Co., 414 N.Y.S.2d
398 (App. Div. 1979).
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dence that the defendant-attorney's conduct fell below the requi-
site standard of care owed to a client.02 The final step in this pro-
gression would, of course, lead to the conclusion that a violation
of one of the terms of the code of professional responsibility con-
stitutes negligence per se and a finding of malpractice, much in
the manner that proof of a violation of a criminal statute is often
conclusive in the imposition of civil liability. 103 To date, however,
courts have been hesitant to adopt this latter rule, although in
the last few years several commentators have strongly urged ap-
plication of this negligence per se approach. 101
The various codes of professional conduct also differ on the
effect of an attorney's violation of an ethical provision. The
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which is currently in effect in virtually every state,
provides unequivocally that it does not establish standards for
purposes of an attorney's liability in a civil action. 105 In contrast,
the 1981 version of the proposed ABA Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct (the so-called "Kutak" rules) did not try to discourage
use of ethical violations in private civil suits, 06 and admitted that
the proposed rules "may have relevance in determining civil li-
ability," but then urged that the rules "not be uncritically incor-
porated in that context," as the purposes of private redress can be
different from the goals of the disciplinary process. 107
102 See, e.g., Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321,323-26 (Ct. App.
1977); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d at 900; Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 327 A.2d
891, 904-07 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Dickinson v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 386-87
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
103 W. PROSSER. supra note 20, § 36, at 190-204.
"O See Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney
Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REv. 281, 319 (1979); Comment, Violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility As Stating A Cause of Action in Legal Malpractice, 6
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 692,705 (1979).
105 "The Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penal-
ties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standardsfor civil
liability of lawyersfor professional conduct." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rry, Preliminary Statement (1969) (emphasis added).
106 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope (Proposed Final Draft May 30,
1981).
107 Id. It is significant to note, however, that the amendments to the so-called Kutak
rules adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 10,
1982, substantially softened the earlier position quoted in the text on the interrelationship
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Two reported Kentucky decisions have already ruled on the
applicability of ethical provisions to civil liability of attorneys.
The first, Hill v. Willmott, l'8 was decided by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in 1978. The plaintiff had argued that violation of the
Code provided a basis for the redress of private grievances, but
the court summarily rejected that contention:
The sole remedial method for a violation of the Code is the im-
position of disciplinary measures .... Nowhere does the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the [Kentucky Supreme
Court] Rule attempt to establish standards for civil liability of
attorneys for their professional negligence. This is not to say
that a cause of action cannot be asserted for negligence on the
part of an attorney. All we are holding is that the duty set forth
in the Code and the Rules establishes the minimum level of
competence for the protection of the public and a violation
thereof does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action. 09
Three and a half years later, when virtually the same issue
reached the Kentucky Supreme Court in Raine v. Drasin, 0 it re-
ceived a considerably warmer welcome. As in Willmott, this case
involved a physician's countersuit against attorneys who had in-
stituted an unsuccessful medical malpractice action, and one of
the issues was whether the expert testimony of a lawyer who was
a member of the Ethics Committee of the Louisville Bar Associa-
tion should have been admitted regarding the defendant-attor-
neys' violation of a provision of the ethics code. The Court up-
held introduction of such testimony on the grounds that such evi-
dence could be offered to establish lack of probable cause, one of
the key elements in a malicious prosecution suit.' On the basis of
the decision in Drasin, there can be little doubt that in the future
the Kentucky Supreme Court will permit proof of an ethics viola-
between ethical standards and attorney liability: "Violation of a Rule should not itself give
rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that an independent legal
duty has been breached :. . . [The Rules] are not designed to be a basis for civil libwr-
ty ... " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope (Final Draft August 10, 1982).
108 561 S.W.2d at 331.
'
9 Id. at 333-34.
110 621 S.W.2d at 895.
11 Id. at 900-01.
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tion to show that an attorney's conduct fell below the requisite
standard of care in a legal malpractice action.
Thus, proof of a violation of the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility may play a considerable role in malpractice
litigation. The most directly applicable provisions appear in
Canon 6 of the current ABA Code, which states that a lawyer
should represent a client "competently." 112 Disciplinary Rule 6-
101 provides, inter alia, that a lawyer shall not "handle a legal
matter which he knows or should know he is not competent to
handle. .", or "neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
While an attorney who violates such provisions might be liable
for malpractice, it is no easier to establish that a lawyer took on a
matter that he or she was not competent to handle or that he or
she neglected a legal matter, than it is to prove that the attorney
was professionally negligent for failing to comply with the stan-
dard of care applicable in the particular circumstances. On the
other hand, some specific Code provisions dealing with attorney
competence could be directly relevant in a lawyer's defense
against a claim of malpractice. If, for example, a former client
brought suit on the grounds that an attorney had accepted em-
ployment in a matter about which the attorney had no prior
training or experience, the attorney might counter by arguing
that he or she intended, through additional research, to become
sufficiently competent to handle the matter, citing EC 6-1, EC 6-
3, and EC 6-4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as direct
support for his defense."' 5 It would be hard to establish that a
lawyer did not utilize the required degree of care on behalf of a
client if the attorney's conduct was in direct compliance with the
aspirational Ethical Considerations in effect in a particular juris-
diction.
Other Disciplinary Rules are more specific in nature, and
therefore might provide a more logical basis on which to contend
that failure to adhere to an ethical requirement constitutes proof
of negligence. For example, under DR 4-101 a lawyer is required
112 Canon 6 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently."
13 MODEL CODE OFPROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(1) (1969).
114 Id. at DR 6-101(A)(2).
115 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-1, 6-3 & 6-4 (1969).
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to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client. If an attorney's
failure to do so resulted in a financial loss to the client, such as
where a valuable trade secret is allowed to fall into the hands of a
competitor during the course of negotiations or litigation, then
violation of a specific provision in DR 4-101 would seem to be di-
rectly applicable in a subsequent malpractice suit against the at-
torney. 6 A similar situation is presented in the area of conflicts
of interest, governed by DR 5-101 through DR 5-106, where an
attorney's violation of a specific ethical provision would seem to
have direct relevance in a malpractice suit seeking to hold the at-
torney liable for any resulting financial loss to the client. 117
Finally, the increasing willingness of Kentucky's highest
court to discipline attorneys for negligence is a reliable indication
of its future attitude in civil suits for legal malpractice. Courts in
Kentucky and elsewhere historically have been reluctant to disci-
pline an attorney for a single act of carelessness or neglect such as
would support a malpractice suit. Instead, courts usually have
reserved suspension or disbarment from practice for particularly
egregious cases of repeated instances of neglect or habitual disre-
gard of clients' interests.18 In recent years, however, the Su-
116 Assume, for purposes of illustration, that an attorney was retained to defend a
patient infringement suit. If, in the process of discovery, the defendant's attorney failed to
review documents prior to turning them over to plaintiffs counsel, and plaintiff thereby
uncovered a valuable secret formula belonging to defendant that was not germane to the
subject matter of the litigation, then defendant's attorney would presumably be liable for
malpractice to the client for any financial losses traceable to disclosure of the formula. In
such a case, the provisions of DR 4-101 dealing with the attorney's obligation to preserve
the secrets of the client would be directly relevant in any malpractice action brought
against the attorney. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A),
(B)(1) & (D) (1969).
117 See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). In Ish-
mael, the defendant-lawyer in a malpractice case had previously and improperly repre-
sented both husband and wife in a divorce, without making full disclosure of his dual rep-
resentation. The court cited both the California and the ABA ethics provisions requiring
loyalty to a client and the duty not to represent conflicting interests unless full disclosure
has been made and the parties have then consented to such representation. Id. at 596.
118 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op.
1273 (1973); Sanchez v. State Bar of Cal., 555 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1976); Kentucky State Bar
Ass'n v. Booth, 444 S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1969); In re Beck, 252 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. 1977); In
re Fraser, 523 P.2d 921 (Wash. 1974).
In Duffin v. Commonwealth, 271 S.W. 555 (Ky. 1925), a lawyer was charged
with failure to account for money due to clients. The court made clear in its opinion that
an attorney should not be disciplined for acts of carelessness or neglect:
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preme Court of Kentucky has shown a greater willingness to im-
pose severe discipline for single or isolated acts of carelessness," 9
including suspension or disbarment in such circumstances. The
imposition of discipline for a single act of neglect, and the sever-
ity of the discipline levied in such cases suggest rather clearly that
the Kentucky Supreme Court will look with favor on malpractice
suits involving similar issues of attorney negligence.
6. Strict Liability in Legal Malpractice
Negligence has long been the cornerstone of liability in ac-
tions brought against physicians, lawyers, accountants and other
professionals for mistakes or errors committed during the perfor-
mance of services. 120 In the medical field, though, there has been
considerable evidence of a shift toward greater accountability.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been widely utilized to alle-
viate some 6f the difficulties in proving negligence, 121 and there is
a discernable movement toward strict liability in medical mal-
practice. 2
[C]arelessness or negligence-even gross carelessness or negligence-has
never been considered by the courts as grounds for the disbarment of an at-
torney. . . .Carelessness and negligence, want of skill and ability, mani-
fest themselves and carry with them their own punishment. They repel
rather than attract clients for an attorney. For carelessness and negligence
an attorney is answerable in damages. An attorney may be disbarred only
when it is made to appear that he is lacking in honesty, probity, or good
moral character.
Id. at 558.
119 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Littleton, 560 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1977); Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Martin, 558 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1977); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jansen, 459
S.W.2d 140 (Ky. 1970).
120 See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 32, at 161-62.
121 See A. HOLDER, supra note 46, at 60-61; W. PROssER. supra note 20, § 39, at 223,
225-28.
122 See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 535-40 (Cal. 1967) (Tobriner, J., con-
curring); Hoven v. KelbIe, 256 N.W.2d 379, 385-93 (Wis. 1977); Epstein, Medical Mal-
practice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87, 96-128. The fact
that physicians carry malpractice insurance undoubtedly is a factor in the increase in li-
ability, since the cost of compensating victims of unfortunate medical errors can thus be
readily spread among a large number of people. See K. BROWN, MEDICAL PROBLEMS AND
THE LAW 220 (1971). The author, a physician, attributes the number and size of verdicts in
medical malpractice cases to a number of factors, including the fact that "[p]atients know
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On the other hand, liability of lawyers to their clients for acts
of carelessness or poor judgment remains firmly posited in the
law of negligence. Although several commentators have urged
that lawyers' accountability should be extended by applying im-
plied warranties to legal services'23 or by imposing strict liabil-
ity,l12 the courts have not shown an inclination to expand liability
by substituting other concepts for negligence. Even the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur has largely remained unused in legal malprac-
tice. 25 Recognition of a higher standard of care for lawyers prac-
ticing in traditional areas of specialization, however, has already
begun to increase an attorney's malpractice exposure. 23 In addi-
tion, at least three California decisions rendered in the last dec-
ade have imposed such high standards of care that they indicate
the start of a trend which could lead to strict liability in legal
malpractice. 127
that doctors have liability insurance and they sometimes feel that it is perfectly all right to
venture a suit at the least provocation because the money actually 'only comes out of an in-
surance carrier."' Id. The alternative in risk-spreading would be "no-fault" medical mal-
practice insurance, a concept which has been given much consideration. See generally A.
HOLDER, supra note 46, at 431; Epstein, supra, at 141-49.
123 See Mallor, Implied Warranties for Legal Services- Tomorrow's Issue?, 6 Omo
N.U.L. REv. 651 (1979); Mallor, Liability Without Fault for Professional Services: To-
ward a New Standard of Professional Accountability, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 474, 488-95
(1978).
124 See Remus, Legal Malpractice: The New Era, 19 N.H.B.J. 11, 17-18, 21-24
(1977); Comment, "Greenian"Analysis, supra note 81, at 1023-25.
125 See, e.g., Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1966); Berman v. Rubin,
227 S.E.2d at 805; Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. at 473-77. But see Donato v. Dutton,
Kappes & Overman, 288 N.E.2d 795,797 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (court recognized applica-
tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in legal malpractice cases, but held that the doc-
trine did not apply in the facts of that case). See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, §
669.
126 See the text accompanying notes 65-80 supra for a discussion of legal specializa-
tion and its impact on the standard of care in legal malpractice.
127 In Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d at 589, for example, an attorney who had repre-
sented the plaintiff in an earlier divorce proceeding was held liable for his failure to under-
take reasonable research in order to ascertain the relevant principles with regard to doubt-
fnl or unsettled areas of the law. Id. at 593-96. The defendant-attorney previously had
represented the wife of a National Guard officer inA a divorce action, but had failed to as-
sert any community property rights in the state or federal retirements benefits of his
client's husband. Ms. Lewis later sued Smith for this omission and was awarded a
$100,000 jury verdict which was upheld on appeal. Id. at 597, 600.
In Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Ct. App. 1976), the court held that
allegations that the drafting error of a general practitioner who had prepared a trust had
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In this regard, the 1978 Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision
of Daugherty v. Runner' 28 imposes a similarly high standard on
lawyers that goes considerably beyond the degree of care that
historically had been applied in this jurisdiction. In Daugherty,
the court upheld a jury verdict in favor of the defendant-attor-
ney, but at the same time the court twice indicated its own dis-
agreement with the jury's decision. '2 Although unwilling to dis-
turb the verdict, the court made it clear that lawyers have a duty
to bring all relevant matters to their clients' attention even where
such information is clearly beyond the scope of employment, be-
cause of the clients' lack of training in the law and consequent in-
ability to protect their own interests. 130 This requirement imposes
a heavy burden on lawyers which goes well beyond any duty pre-
viously asserted in legal malpractice cases decided in Kentucky.'13
caused taxation not intended or anticipated by the client stated a cause of action for legal
malpractice. The attorney had drafted a revocable inter vivos trust which contained a
"marital deduction" portion and a "family" portion, and was intended to pass the estate to
the client's wife and child with minimum federal and state tax liability at the deaths of the
client and his wife. Id. at 515-16. However, the trust provided that on the client's death
his wife would retain the power to revoke the trust for her life. Id. at 516. The inclusion of
this power for the wife's life created a general power of appointment in her, which would
have incurred a federal estate tax at her death under I.R.C. § 2041. When she renounced
the power during her life and thus avoided the estate tax, the renunciation still incurred a
federal gift tax, as well as a state gift tax. Id. at 517.
And in Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 714, a general practitioner was held
liable for failing to refer the preparation of a Clifford, or short-term, trust to a tax special-
ist, even though the idea of such a trust originated with the client; the attorney told the
client that he was not experienced in such matters; the client's accountant provided re-
search assistance; the client decided on the type of property to be used to fund the trust,
switching at the last minute from the transfer of a patent to the trust to the transfer of a
non-exclusive license in that patent; and the general practitioner had questioned the
client's tax lawyer about the effectiveness of transferring such a non-exclusive patent to
such a trust. Id. at 715-16. However, other facts tended to offset these circumstances. For
instance, the only research source the general practitioner consulted was a two-volume set
of American Jurisprudence on federal taxation; his "consultation" with the tax attorney
was, at best, brief; and the tax attorney, unbeknownst to the defendant-lawyer, had been
licensed to practice law for less than a year, although he had previously worked for several
years as a tax accountant. Id. at 716.
12 581 S.W.2d at 12.
129 The Court stated: "While we may have found differently had we sat as jurors in
this case, we believe there is sufficient evidence to support this jury's verdict .... "Id. at
18. The court later reiterated this reaction. Id. at 20.
130 See the court's statement on this point, quoted in the text accompanying note 41
supra.
131 Here, as in medical malpractice, the trend toward greater accountability prob-
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C. Proof of Causation
In any cause of action the plaintiff must prove that the defen-
dant's act or omission was a proximate cause of his or her in-
juries. This essential element is no different in a legal malpractice
case than it is in any other suit founded upon rregligence.132 There
are, however, several aspects of causation in legal malpractice
that can present unusual and complex problems of proof. 3 3
1. Proving a "Suit Within a Suit"
Many legal malpractice cases are posited on the negligent
failure of an attorney to take certain steps during litigation, and
the consequent loss to a client of a possible recovery in the orig-
inal suit. This situation is often presented when an attorney has
failed to initiate an action within the statute of limitations
period, and the client subsequently brings a malpractice suit
claiming that if the suit had been timely filed the plaintiff would
ably has been influenced by the fact that a majority of lawyers now carry malpractice in-
surance. Estimates of the proportion of lawyers in private practice who carry legal mal-
practice insurance range from below 50 % to above 90 %. See Denenberg, Ehre & Huling,
Lawyers' Professional Liability Insurance: The Peril, the Protection, and the Price, 1970
INS. L.J. 389, 391-92; O'Hara, SuedI-Not Me, I'm a Lawyer, 40 Ky. BENCH & B., 28
(Oct. 1976); Comment, Should Legal Malpractice Insurance Be Mandatory?, 1978
B.Y.U. L. REv. 102; Suing Your Lawyer, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 1975, at 95. John J.
O'Hara, former chairman of the Kentucky Bar Association's Legal Malpractice Insurance
Committee, estimated that two-thirds of the licensed lawyers in Kentucky in 1976 prac-
ticed without benefit of malpractice insurance. O'Hara, supra, at 28. Newsweek stated in
1975 that about 90% of the urban lawyers and 65% of attorneys in smaller communities
are insured. Suing Your Lawyer, supra, at 95. Perhaps the most reliable nationwide infor-
mation, based upon estimates provided by state bar directors and practicing attorneys,
places the figure at 55 % as of 1976. See Comment, supra, at 106 n.24.
132 For a discussion of proximate causation in malpractice suits, see the numerous
cases cited in R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 102 n.68.
133 Even after the often difficult causal connection between an attorney's negligence
and his former client's injury has been shown, equally onerous problems in proving dam-
ages can be presented. See, e.g., Floro v. Lawton, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
In Floro, the defendant-attorney was allowed to avoid liability by showing that the defen-
dant in the original suit was judgment proof. Thus, even if the attorney had not been neg-
ligent, the client still would not have been compensated because any award would not
have been collectable. Id. at 106. For a discussion of the general rules applicable to the re-
covery of compensatory damages in legal malpractice suits, see Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d
433, 436 (Cal. 1971); Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar. Corp., 381 P.2d 645, 647 (Cal.
1963); Mitchell v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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have received a favorable award.' 34 But the same issue can be
raised by other circumstances after a lawsuit has been lost and
the client attributes his or her misfortune to the attorney's lack of
skill or diligence. For example, if an attorney failed to argue a
particular substantive point'," or did not interview certain addi-
tional witnesses, 136 the client could contend that the lawyer's
omission was the cause of the unfavorable decision.
Proof of the causal connection between an attorney's negli-
gence and the plaintiff's claim that he or she would otherwise
have prevailed in a prior action has been referred to as proving "a
suit within a suit."' 37 In such a case the plaintiff must first prove
that the defendant-lawyer had been negligent, and then establish
that if the lawyer had not been negligent the original claim
would have been successfully prosecuted. With regard to this lat-
ter causal factor, the jury sitting in a malpractice action must de-
termine what recovery, if any, the plaintiff would have received
if the attorney had handled the original matter competently. In
effect, the plaintiff must try the original cause of action as part of
the required proof in the malpractice claim. 18
Several fairly recent Kentucky cases serve to illustrate the
problems and pitfalls in proving "a suit within a suit." In Mit-
chell v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 39 plaintiffs brought suit
against their former attorney for allowing the one-year Kentucky
134 See, e.g., Coon v. Ginsberg, 509 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Mitchell
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d at 586; Utterback-Gleason Co. v. Standard Acci-
dent Ins. Co. of Detroit, Mich., 184 N.Y.S. 862, 867 (App. Div. 1920); Jackson v. Urban,
Coolidge, Pennington & Scott, 516 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Note, The
Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 666, 667-
68 (1977-78).
135 For example, in Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d at 589, the attorney failed to raise and
argue the client's community property interest in her husband's retirement benefits. For
further discussion of Smith v. Lewis, see note 127 supra and the text accompanying notes
25-27supra.
136 See the discussion of Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d at 33, in the text accompany-
ing notes 32-35supra (a case involving an attorney's failure to interview witnesses).
1 The phrase "a suit within a suit," which is widely used, is apparently attributable
to a 1958 law review article-Coggin, Attorney Negligence ... A Suit Within a Suit, 60
W. VA. L. REv. 225 (1958). The Kentucky Court of Appeals used this terminology in
Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d at 13.
138 See generally C. KINDRECAN, supra note 28, at 24-31; R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT,
supra note 6, §§ 656-57.
139 551 S.W.2d at 586.
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limitations period4O to run on their personal injury claims arising
out of an automobile accident that occurred in Kentucky. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's award of
damages because plaintiffs failed to prove the causal connection
between the attorney's negligence and their entitlement to a re-
covery in the action which was not timely filed. 14 This sound
conclusion was based upon the fact that the plaintiffs had subse-
quently retained a second lawyer who had the foresight to file
suit in Indiana where the tortfeasor also could be served, 112 there-
by benefitting from Indiana's two-year statute of limitations,13
and the lawsuit was settled for $60,000.144
Daughtery v. Runner 45 also illustrates the problems in prov-
ing "a suit within a suit." In this legal malpractice action, the
plaintiff-client had to establish that the defendant-attorney had
acted negligently in not filing a medical malpractice suit and
then had to prove what the recovery would have been had the
medical claim been prosecuted in a timely fashion. The plaintiff
failed to convince the jury that the attorney had been at fault in
not pursuing the medical malpractice cause of action. Interest-
ingly, the jury also found that if the original suit had been
brought, the plaintiff would have recovered $146,123.75.'46
140 KRS § 413.140(1)(a) (1972).
141551 S.W.2d at 588.
142 Id. at 587.
143 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (West 1976).
144 551 S.W.2d at 588.
145 581 S.W.2d at 12.
1'6 581 S.W.2d at 14. The jury's verdict in Daugherty is somewhat of an anomaly. If
plaintiffs in a legal malpractice suit can get their case to the jury, then the chances of a
favorable verdict are considered to be very high. See note 44 supra for a discussion of this
point. It appears here as if the jury was confused by the case, or at least by the form of the
special verdict, as reflected by the verdict that was returned. If the jury believed that the
defendant-attorney was not negligent, then it served little purpose to determine that
$146,123.75 would have been recovered under the prior medical malpractice suit. Con-
versely, if the jury felt that the plaintiff had been deprived of an award of $146,123.75,
then one would expect that same jury, if it understood the case before it and the conse-
quences of its answers to the special verdict, would find the defendant negligent so that the
plaintiff would be entitled to the specific recovery. While the jury's finding is not inconsis-
tent or contradictory in a legal sense, it seems illogical from a practical standpoint. At any
rate, it would certainly be foolhardy for lawyers to take too much comfort from the jury's
verdict for the attorney in Daugherty or to expect that another jury might be similarly
confused in a comparable legal malpractice "suit within a suit."
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2. Intervening Causes
As was indicated in Mitchell v. Transamerica Insurance
Co. ,u4 a lawyer can be relieved of the consequences of his own
negligence as a result of action taken by a subsequently retained
attorney. But what if the second attorney is also negligent and
also fails to take actions which would have prevented injury to
the plaintiff-client?
It is a basic tenet of negligence law that a tortfeasor's conduct
does not have to be the sole cause of a claimant's injuries, so long
as it is a substantial and proximate cause.' 48 On the other hand,
the law also recognizes that certain subsequent events may be
considered "superseding causes" that can interrupt the causal
chain between the first tortfeasor's negligence and the ultimate
injury. 149 Several legal malpractice cases, 150 including two leading
ones from Kentucky,' 5' address this question of intervening
causes which may relieve a person of the consequences of his neg-
ligence.
In one Kentucky case, Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co. ,152 plain-
tiff Carrico brought suit against his former attorneys for their
failure to bring an action within the one-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident.
The attorneys had brought timely suit for the wrongful death of
plaintiffs wife and for property damage, but did not realize until
after a year had passed that plaintiff had suffered substantial
personal injuries. 15 Plaintiff then dismissed the original attorneys
147 551 S.W.2d at 586. See the text accompanying notes 140-44 supra for a discussion
of Mitchell and the "suit within a suit" requirement.
148 See Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d at 143-44; Claycomb v. Howard, 493 S.W.2d
714, 718 (Ky. 1973); W. PROSsER, supra note 20, § 41, at 238-41.
149 W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 44, at 270-89; 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 440 (1965). A "superseding cause" is nothing more than an "intervening cause" which
has risen to a certain undefined level and thereby broken the causal chain between the de-
fendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury, thus relieving the defendant of liability. See
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 comment on subsection (2) (1965).
150 See, e.g., Cline v. Watkins, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1977); Collins v.
Greenstein, 595 P.2d 275 (Hawaii 1979). See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note
6, § 102, at 178.
151 Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d at 12; Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., 414
S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1967).
152 414 S.W.2d at 908.
15 Id. at 909. Carrico's substantial personal injuries apparently first came to the at-
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and retained a second attorney who promptly filed an amended
complaint for plaintiff's personal injuries. The trial court dis-
missed the amended complaint, holding that the personal injury
claim was barred by the statute of limitations.'m No appeal was
taken from this judgment. Plaintiff then filed a legal malpractice
suit against his original attorneys, charging thbm with negligence
in failing to assert his personal injury claim within the statute of
limitations.
In defense of the malpractice action, the defendant-attorneys
claimed that the failure to appeal the trial court ruling dismissing
the amended complaint was the cause of plaintiff's damages, not
any neglect on their part. Defendants contended that the
amended complaint should have been allowed to stand since it
related back to the original cause of action, and the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in the subsequent malpractice suit agreed, al-
beit by a divided vote. 155 But the court further held that the de-
fendant-attorneys could not escape responsibility for their mal-
practice merely because the plaintiff had not pursued a perfect
course of legal action.'5 Thus, the failure to appeal the erroneous
dismissal was held not to constitute a superseding cause that
would relieve the original attorneys of the consequences of their
negligence. 157
tention of his lawyers during his deposition, taken some 14 months after the accident oc-
curred. Id.
15 4 Id.
155 A majority of the court believed that only one cause of action arose from the colli-
sion between Carrico's automobile and the truck owned by Haydon Oil Co. Thus, the per-
sonal injuries to Carrico were part of the same "conduct, transaction or occurrence" as the
claims for his wife's wrongful death and the property damage to their car. Id. at 911. The
dissent, however, believed that a number of causes of action arose from the accident, each
with its own statute of limitations; thus, there was no "relation back" of the cause of action
for his injuries. Id. at 913. (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 912. The court could not find any discernable difference between the facts
in Wimsatt and those in cases in which personal injuries have been followed by less than
adequate medical treatment and the injured individual is allowed to recover for the full
extent of his or her injuries if proof is offered to show the injured party exercised reason-
able care in selecting the treating physician. Id.
157 It is interesting to contrast the court's decision in Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co.
with a well-known malpractice suit arising 13 years earlier in North Carolina, Hodges v.
Carter, 80 S.E.2d at 144. In Hodges, the defendant-attorneys filed suit on behalf of the
plaintiff against five fire insurance companies doing business in the state but incorporated
elsewhere. The attorneys attempted to serve the companies through the state commis-
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The second Kentucky case dealing with the failure of a subse-
quent attorney to exculpate the first attorney's negligence is the
now-familiar Daugherty v. Runner.1ss Although many of the
court's comments in this case can technically be considered dicta
because it upheld the jury verdict in favor of the defendant-attor-
ney, 59 these statements have had a considerable impact on the
law of legal malpractice in this state. In Daugherty, the defen-
dant-attorney's failure to file a medical malpractice claim within
one year of the claimant's death formed the basis of the malprac-
tice suit. However, the decedent's estate retained the services of a
second lawyer several days before the expiration of the one-year
period for the expressed purpose of filing a medical malpractice
claim. Inexplicably, no such claim was filed within that
period.I" The estate then turned the case over to still a third at-
torney who, a year and a half after claimant's death, filed a med-
sioner of insurance, but that action proved unsuccessful when challenged by the com-
panies in a special appearance. Id. at 144. Instead of seeking service on the companies
through other means, which they could have done in the 60 days left before expiration of
the statute of limitations, the attorneys rested their case on the substituted service, which
was held to have been invalid. See Hodges v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 63 S.E.2d 819
(N.C. 1951). But the same North Carolina Supreme Court was all-forgiving in the subse-
quent malpractice suit brought against the attorneys:
An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his ad-
vice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of his client is not an-
swerable for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in a point of law
which has not been settled by the court of last resort in his State and on
which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed law-
yers ....
Doubtless this litigation was inspired by a comment which appears in
our opinion on the second appeal, Hodges v. Home Ins. Co .... However,
what was there said was pure dictum, injected-perhaps ill advisedly-in
explanation of the reason we could afford plaintiff no relief on that appeal.
We did not hold, or intend to intimate, that defendants had been in any
wise neglectful of their duties as counsel for plaintiff.
80 S.E.2d at 146.
The suggestion is not being made that the law of legal malpractice is different in
North Carolina than it is in Kentucky, but only that the 13 year hiatus between the deci-
sions in the two cases has seen substantial changes in the law and in judicial attitudes to-
ward legal malpractice. That fact more than anything else explains the differences in the
holdings in Wimsatt and Hodges.
158 581 S.W.2d at 12.
'
59 Id. at 18, 20.
160 Id. at 15, 18.
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ical malpractice suit that was dismissed as barred by the one-year
statute of limitations. 161 No appeal was taken from that decision.
According to the court in the subsequent malpractice suit,
the trial court's dismissal may have been erroneous. 112 In spite of
this, the court concluded that the alleged negligence of the subse-
quent attorneys was not, as a matter of law, a superseding cause
which would relieve the first attorney of his negligence. 113 Either
of the subsequent attorneys could have avoided the problem al-
legedly created by the first attorney by acting promptly or by ap-
pealing. But as was indicated in Wimsatt, such intervening fac-
tors do not relieve the first attorney from the consequences which
his negligence originally set in motion.
The court in Daughterty, however, failed to address a cru-
cial question. A decision that an intervening cause does not re-
lieve the first tortfeasor of the effect of his negligence necessarily
presupposes that the person was in fact negligent. 16 Here, how-
ever, the medical malpractice matter had been turned over to
another attorney while a few days still remained in the one-year
period dating from the claimant's death.16 Unless it can be said
that a lawyer is negligent in not filing a cause of action well with-
in the statute of limitations period, it seems that the first attorney
should be relieved of any continuing accountability when the
medical malpractice aspects of the case were referred to another
attorney before the statutory period had run. 166
161 Id. at 14, 18.
162 Id. at 14 n. 1.
163 Unless there is an issue of fact as to whether an act or event actually occurred, the
question of whether an intervening act constituted a superseding cause which would re-
lieve a prior tortfeasor of the consequences of negligence is a matter for determination by
the court in Kentucky and should not be submitted to a jury. House v. Kellerman, 519
S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1974). In other jurisdictions it is considered a factual issue for determina-
tion by the jury. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 102. See generally W. PRos-
SER, supra note 20, § 45, at 289-90.
164See, e.g., Shelly v. Hansen, 53 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); W. PROSSER,
supra note 20, § 44, at 281-84.
165 581 S.W.2d at 15, 18. The retention of this second lawyer, who accepted a re-
tainer fee, followed two earlier, unsuccessful attempts to retain other attorneys to handle
the medical malpractice claim. Id. at 18.
166 Once the client had turned the medical claim over to another attorney, Runner
had no further responsibility for that matter and therefore was no longer in a position to
have filed suit within the limitations period.
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It is virtually impossible to know when a subsequent causal
factor will be deemed to supersede an original act of negligence
in any cause of action, but as a general proposition, the first tort-
feasor is rarely given a reprieve from the consequence of his or
her negligent actions.'6 This is certainly the case in legal mal-
practice, as reflected by Wimsatt and Daugherty, as well as by
decisions reached in other jurisdictions. 16 However, the concepts
of intervening and superseding causes involve decisions of pol-
icy, 16 no matter how well disguised,170 and these policy consider-
ations are undoubtedly reflected in legal malpractice decisions,
including, in particular, Daugherty v. Runner, where the court
could have easily relieved the original attorney of liability.
D. Defenses
Many of the defenses available in a negligence suit apply, at
least in theory, to a legal malpractice action.' Attention is fo-
Shelly v. Hansen, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 20, is analogous. There, a legal malpractice
action was brought against two attorneys who successfully represented the claimant for
failure to file suit within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The court held
that when the responsibility for bringing suit shifted to the second attorney, the first attor-
ney had no further duty to the client and thus could not be negligent for not filing suit
within the statutory period. Id. at 22-23. As the court succinctly put the matter:
To warrant recovery for this type of negligence plaintiff must first plead and
prove that at the critical times in question there existed the relationship of
attorney and client with its accompanying responsibilities.. . . During the
last seven months of the statutory period, the responsibility for filing the
breach of contract action lay with Hansen (the second attorney) and not
with Docken (the first attorney); furthermore, even if the latter had wished
to do so, the proceeding could not have been instituted by him due to the ter-
mination of his employment as above stated. Stated otherwise, if Docken
then had no duty to perform, how can it be properly urged that such duty
was negligently carried out?
Id. at23.
167 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 44, at 270-89. Contra Robinson v.
Butler, 33 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Minn. 1948). In Robinson, a passenger's unexpected reaction
in a situation brought about by the negligence of another motorist was held to be "so extra-
ordinary that it must be said to constitute an efficient intervening cause' which relieved
the driver from the consequences of his negligence. Id. at 824.
18 See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 102.
169 See Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Wis. 1975); W.
PROSSER, supra note 20, § 44, at 270-72, 283, 285-86.
170 See the excellent discussion of this point by the late Justice Lukowsky in Deutsch
v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d at 143-44.
171 See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, §§ 350-66; C. KINDREcAN, supra note
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cused here, however, on two defenses which have long shielded
attorneys from valid legal malpractice claims-the statute of lim-
itations and lack of privity. In the last decade or two, courts
throughout the country have begun to alleviate the harshness of
these rules, and the reaction in a given jurisdiction to proposed
changes in these defenses is a solid indicator of the prevailing atti-
tudes toward legal malpractice.
1. Statute of Limitations
As a general rule, the statute of limitations for a cause of ac-
tion based upon negligence begins to run at the time of occur-
rence of the negligent act or omission.172 In medical malpractice,
this precept once applied with a vengence. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals in Carter v. Harlan Hospital Association,'73 for in-
stance, held that a patient's claim against her surgeon was prop-
erly dismissed when she sued after the one-year statute of limita-
tions period had run, even though she did not discover the cause
of her discomfort until thirty months after her operation, when
forceps were discharged from her bowels 7 Carter remained the
law in Kentucky until Tomlinson v. Siehl,175 where it was held
that the statute did not begin to run on causes of action against
physicians until the negligent act was actually discovered. 176 The
Tomlinson decision placed Kentucky among the growing num-
28, at 54-62. For example, in a number of legal malpractice cases, the defense of contrib-
utory negligence has been raised by the defendant-attorney. See, e.g., Theobold v. Byers,
13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1971);
Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d at 1238. In addition, an attorney defending a malpractice
suit can assert other defenses that are generally available in any civil cause of action. See
e.g., Felger v. Nichols, 370 A.2d 141 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (res judicata); Golden v.
Duggins, 374 So.2d 243 (Miss. 1979).
172 See, e.g., Finck v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 136 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943);
Gore v. Debaryshe, 278 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Ky. 1968); Cravins v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
222 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1920).
173 97 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1936).
174 Id. at 10. For similar application of the statute of limitations to medical malprac-
tice cases arising in other jurisdictions, see Pasquale v. Chandler, 215 N.E.2d 319 (Mass.
1966); Vaughn v. Langmack, 390 P.2d 142 (Or. 1964); Hawks v. DeHart, 146 S.E.2d 166
(V__19q6 ).
175 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970).
17 6 Id. at 168. A year later, in Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971), the
Court modified the discovery rule adopted in Tomlinson to provide that the limitations
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ber of jurisdictions to adopt the "discovery" rule or a comparable
doctrine to alleviate the harshness which often resulted from
strict application of the statute of limitations to medical malprac-
tice actions. 17
The courts have been considerably slower in adopting the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in legal malprac-
tice suits. 78 Several recurring situations illustrate the unfortunate
consequences that can result from application of the general rule
that the limitations period commences at the date of the negli-
gent act. 179 If, for example, an attorney who had been hired to
search title to real estate negligently failed to detect a lien on the
property, that omission might not surface for a number of years
after the limitations period had run. 180 Another common circum-
stance occurs when an attorney negligently permits a person
named beneficiary in a will also to serve as a witness. The conse-
period would run not from the date of discovery, but from an earlier date when, in the ex-
ercise of ordinary care and diligence, the negligence should have been discovered. Id. at
379-80,
The "discovery rule" in medical malpractice first adopted in Tomlinson, and
modified in Hackworth, was codified in 1972 by a new statute providing that medical
malpractice actions do not accrue until "the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been discovered;" but the legislature then placed a ceiling on
the discovery period by the added proviso that "such action shall be commenced within
five (5) years from the date on which the alleged negligent act or omission is said to have
occurred." KRS § 413.140(2) (Supp. 1980).
177 See, e.g., Huysman v. Kirsch, 57 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1936); Morgan v. Grace Hospi-
tal, Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W.Va. 1965). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 31, at
144-45, nn. 56-60.
178 See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, §§ 373-94.
179 See, e.g., Master Mortgage Corp. v. Byers, 202 S.E.2d 566 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)
(title examination); Sullivan v. Stout, 199 A. 1 (N.J. 1938) (title examination); Goldberg
v. Bosworth, 215 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (attestation of will).
180 Although not involving statutes of limitations, a number of legal malpractice
cases in Kentucky have arisen as a result of allegedly negligent title searches. See, e.g.,
Owen v. Neely, 471 S.W.2d at 705; Morehead's Trustee v. Anderson, 100 S.W. at 340
(dicta); Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v. Duckers Ex'r, 82 S.W. at 969; Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v.
Ducker's Ex'x, 64 S.W. at 671. Owen v. Neely involved discrepancies between a deed de-
scription and a survey description which were not noted by the examining attorney. The
court overturned the summary judgment which had been granted in favor of the attorney,
on the grounds that it was a question of fact for the jury whether the attorney, in the exer-
cise of due care, should have conducted further investigation or reported the discrepancies
to his client. 471 S.W.2d at 708. An interesting question raised but not resolved by Owen
v. Neely is the extent to which attorneys performing a title search can protect themselves
by the use of reservations and disclaimers in the title opinion. Id. at 707-08.
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quences of that action generally would not become known until
the testator died and the will was offered for probate.18 Again,
the passage of time from the negligent act to its discovery would
usually exceed the statutory period and bar any cause of action
against the attorney. Commencing in the late 1960s, however,
courts in this country started to react to these obvious injustices,
and, borrowing freely from medical malpractice cases, began to
apply the "discovery" rule in actions for legal malpractice.8 2
Once this breakthrough was made, many other jurisdictions
rapidly adopted the same resolution.""
While this precise issue has not been presented in a legal mal-
practice context in Kentucky, the courts of this state have not
hesitated to expand the "discovery" rule beyond medical mal-
practice when the need has arisen. In Louisville Trust Co. v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp. ,18 the Kentucky Supreme Court
applied the "discovery" rule in a products liability action against
the decedent's employer for injuries from a latent disease caused
by exposure to asbestos. The action was brought within one year
of the diagnosis of decedent's illness, but that was nearly five
years after the decedent had left the defendant's employment. 18
The same approach would undoubtedly have been used to
deal with limitations problems in legal malpractice suits. The
matter became moot, however, when the 1980 Kentucky legisla-
ture adopted the following statute of limitations provision:
[A] civil action ... arising out of any act or omission in
181 See, e.g., Goldbergv. Bosworth, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
182 The Maryland Court of Appeals was the first court to apply the "discovery" rule
in a legal malpractice context. Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 255 A.2d 359 (Md.
1969). Although reaching the same result in a similar factual setting, the California Su-
preme Court in Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969), technically did not base its deci-
sion upon the "discovery" rule. Clear adoption of the "discovery" rule to toll the statute of
limitations in legal malpractice cases came two years later in California. Neel v. Magana,
Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Colfand, 491 P.2d 421 (Cal. 1971).
183 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d at 1019; Downing v. Vaine, 228 So. 2d
622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Kohler v. Woullen, Brown & Hawkins, 304 N.E.2d 677
(1ll. Ct. App. 1973); Anderson v. Neal, 428 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1981); Hendrickson v. Sears,
310 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1974); McKee v. Riordan, 366 A.2d 472 (N.H. 1976); Amerac-
count Club, Inc. v. Hill, 617 S.W.2d 876 (Tenn. 1981); Family Say. & Loan, Inc. v. Cic-
carello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W.Va. 1974).
184 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979).
18 Id. at 499.
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rendering, or failing to render, professional services for others
shall be brought within one (1) year from the date of the occur-
rence or from the date when the cause of action was, or reason-
ably should have been, discovered by the party injured. 186
A companion provision was simultaneously added to define "pro-
fessional services" as "any services rendered in a profession re-
quired to be licensed, administered and regulated as professions
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky."'87 That definition clearly
and unequivocally covers the legal profession, and by reason of
this recently enacted legislation, the statute of limitations for a
cause of action for legal malpractice in Kentucky now incorpo-
rates the "discovery" rule.
2. Privity
For almost a century, the universally accepted rule in legal
malpractice decisions was that an attorney was not liable to any
person other than the immediate client, even though the attor-
ney's negligence may have injured someone else. 8 8 Application of
this privity doctrine proved particularly severe when the attor-
ney's services were intended to benefit a third party. That indi-
vidual, rather than the client, was the one likely to be injured if
the professional services were rendered in an incompetent man-
ner. 189 Yet courts consistently denied the right to maintain a mal-
practice action to plaintiffs who could not establish privity. 190
Two decisions of the California Supreme Court some twenty
years ago broke through the privity barrier in certain legal mal-
practice situations. In Biakanja v. Irving,9' the California court
1I KRS § 413.245 (Supp. 1980).
187 KRS § 413.243 (Supp. 1980).
188 See Savings Bankv. Ward, 100 U.S. at 195.
189 See, e.g., id. (purchaser injured due to faulty title examination); Mickel v.
Murphy, 305 P.2d 993 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (error in will causing injury to disap-
pointed legatee); Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900 (Cal. 1895) (will error); Williams v. Plogar,
215 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 1974) (negligent title examination); Maneri v. Amodeo, 238
N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (will error).
190 See note 189 supra for a list of decisions discussing this point. See also Jacobsen v.
Overseas Tankship Corp., 11 F.R.D. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Rose v. Davis, 157 S.W.2d at
284; Kasen v. Morrell, 183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Hakaa v. Van Schaick, 12
N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
191 320P.2d at 16.
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held that a disappointed beneficiary under an invalid will could
sue a notary public who had negligently prepared the will, over-
ruling its oft-cited decision rendered under similar facts more
than fifty years earlier. 192 Several years after Biakanja, the Cali-
fornia court in Lucas v. Hamm 193 put to rest any doubts about
whether Biakania applied only to suits involving will drafting er-
rors committed by persons not authorized to practice law. It held
that a disgruntled beneficiary could maintain a cause of action
for legal malpractice against the lawyer who had drafted the
will, even though the decedent and not the beneficiary had been
the client who was in privity of contract with the attorney.19
However, the floodgates of third party malpractice litigation
were not thrown wide open, because the California coutt substi-
tuted a balancing-of-factors test for the old privity doctrine, so
that new requirements had to be met before someone other than
a client could sue an attorney for negligent acts or omissions. 19
Many other jurisdictions have followed the Biakania and Lucas
holdings. 1 6 As a consequence, the absence of privity will no
192 The Biakania decision overruled Buckley v. Cray, 42 P. at 950, which had been
reaffirmed in California one short year prior to Biakanja. See also Mickel v. Murphy, 305
P.2d at 993.
193 364 P.2d at 685.
194 Id. at 688-89. Lucas v. Hamm is infamous for its holding that a lawyer is not
necessarily negligent for violating the rule against perpetuities. This aspect of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision has, unfortunately, tended to eclipse the ruling that a dis-
gruntled beneficiary can bring a malpractice suit against the lawyer who drafted the
faulty will or trust, even though not in privity with him. It should be noted, however, that
while Lucas v. Hamm has not been directly overruled on this point of substantive law
(e.g., malpractice for violating the rule against perpetuities), it has been largely discred-
ited in subsequent California decisions. See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d at 595-96; Home v.
Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21; Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19;
Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
195 The following factors were utilized by the California Supreme Court to deter-
mine the propriety of a legal malpractice suit brought by someone other than the immedi-
ate client: the extent to which the legal services were intended to benefit the third person;
the foreseeability of the injury to the third party; the certainty that the third party would
have benefitted but for the attorney's negligence; the policy of preventing future harm by
permitting persons other than the client to recover since the client himself is unable to re-
cover; and the extent to which imposition of liability might result in an undue burden on
the legal profession. 364 P.2d at 688.
196 See, e.g., Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Licata
v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. 1966); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Stewart v. Sbarro, 362 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1976).
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longer automatically shield an attorney from malpractice liabil-
ity to persons other than the client.
Kentucky law on this issue is not as well defined as in many
other jurisdictions, but the cases do indicate that the privity rule
may no longer be the law, at least when the attorney's services
were intended to benefit a third party. Rose v. Davis,197 decided
in 1941, was the leading Kentucky decision in this area until re-
cently. In Rose, the plaintiff's malpractice suit grew out of an
earlier divorce action in which the attorney had represented the
plaintiffs wife. The trial court had granted the divorce and had
awarded the wife $60 a month in alimony. That judgment was
reversed on appeal on the ground that the wife had a living hus-
band at the time of her marriage to the plaintiff, and the latter
marriage was therefore bigamous and void. 198 The plaintiff then
brought an action against his former wife's lawyer to recover the
amounts he had paid in alimony and court costs. The court in the
malpractice action upheld the demurrer which had been entered
in the defendant-attorney's favor because of the lack of privity
between the parties.19
Although Rose v. Davis technically remains the law in Ken-
tucky, the Kentucky Court of Appeals' 1978 decision of Hill v.
Willmott strongly indicates that the courts in this jurisdiction
are ready to allow a third party to institute a malpractice suit
against a lawyer where it has been anticipated that the attorney's
services would benefit that person. Hill was a physician's coun-
tersuit against an attorney who had previously represented the
plaintiffs in an unsuccessful medical malpractice action against
the same physician. Instead of basing his cause of action upon the
usual malicious prosecution grounds, the physician relied upon a
197 157 S.W.2d at 284.
198 Id.
199 Id. The court explained:
An attorney is not ordinarily liable to third persons for his acts committed in
representing a client. It is only where his acts are fraudulent or tortious and
result in injury to third persons that he is liable. To hold an attorney respon-
sible for the damages occasioned by an erroneous judicial order, even though
the error be induced by him, would make the practice of law one of such fi-
nancial hazard that few men would care to incur the risk of its practice.
Id. at 284-85.
200 561 S.W.2d at 331.
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negligence theory. The physician contended, without success,
that an attorney owes a duty of care to the party against whom
suit is brought, based upon certain ethical principles set forth in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.201 While rejecting negli-
gence as a foundation for such a countersuit, the court in Hill v.
Willmott proceeded to indicate that there could be situations
where a person other than the client would have a cause of action
for malpractice against an attorney:
The California appellate court recently confronted this prob-
lem [whether an attorney owes a duty to a third person] in
Donald v. Garry,... and reached a workable solution.
Therein an attorney employed by a collection agency to bring
an action for the collection of a debt owed to a client of the
agency was held liable to the individual creditor despite the
absence of privity of contract when the collection proceeding
was dismissed for lack of diligent prosecution due to the attor-
ney's negligence. In so holding, the court stated that 'An attor-
ney may be liable for damage caused by his negligence to a per-
son intended to be benefited by his performance irrespective of
any lack of privity . . .' We believe this to be a proper state-
ment of the law in this Commonwealth.202
The relaxation of the statute of limiations and the erosion of
the privity doctrine modify two technical defenses that had for
years been formidable barriers to prosecution of legal malprac-
tice cases.203 As a consequence, legal malpractice claims are cer-
tain to increase, both in Kentucky and nationwide, in the years
to come.
II. COUNTERSUITS AGAINST ATTORNEYS
As has been noted, an attorney can be held accountable for
mistakes or errors on a professional negligence theory to a former
201 Id. at 333.
202 Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
203 See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 79, at 393-94; C. KIND-
RECAN, supra note 28, at 27-30, 54-57; Houser, Legal Malpractice-An Overview, 55
N.D.L. REv. 185, 215-18 (1979). Wade, supra note 2, at 758-60; Note, supra note 4, at
1311; Note, Legal Malpractice-Is the Discovery Rule the Final Solution?, 24 HASTmNS
L.J. 795 (1973); Comment, New Developments, supra note 82, at 421-29.
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client or to a third party who was the intended beneficiary of the
legal services. In addition, an attorney also may be liable on the
basis of an intentional tort-malicious prosecution-to persons
against whom he has previously brought suit.
Originally available as a cause of action only when the initial
litigation was criminal in nature, malicious prosecution has long
been extended to cover civil actions as well.m A cause of action
for malicious prosecution requires proof of the following ele-
ments: (1) institution by the defendant of a prior suit which ter-
minated in the defendant's favor; (2) lack of probable cause in
bringing the prior suit; (3) malice in prosecuting the original suit;
and (4) damages as a consequence of the initial proceedings.m
The damages requirement can be difficult to satisfy, particularly
in those jurisdictions that follow the so-called "English" rule
which requires showing of a "special injury."' ' Lack of "prob-
able cause" and "malice" have also been substantial barriers pre-
cluding recovery in suits posited on malicious prosecution.207
However, when examined separately, these four
requirements do not appear all that difficult to prove. Even
though the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action has the
burden of proving the absence of "probable cause,"' ' the de-
204 W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §§ 119-20, at 834-56; Birnbaum, Physicians Coun-
terattack: Liability of Lawyers For Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions,
45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1003, 1020-33 (1977); Note, Liability for Proceeding With Un-
founded Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 743,745-54 (1980). However, the courts in England
severely limit the types of injury for which compensation can be received in malicious pro-
secution actions in situations where the original proceedings were civil rather than crim-
inal, and this "English" or "special injury" rule has been adopted in a substantial number
of American jurisdictions. See Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. App. 1978);
O'Toole v. Franklin, 569 P.2d 561 (Or. 1977); W. PRossER, supra note 20, § 120, at 851;
Birnbaum, supra at 1021-22.
Mes Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d at 895; Cravens v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 548 (Ky.
1953); Davis v. Brady, 291 S.W. 412 (Ky. 1927); W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 120, at
853-56.
2W See Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); O'Toole v. Franklin,
569 P.2d at 561; Mallen, An Attorney's Liability for Malicious Prosecution, A Misunder-
stood Tort, 46 INs. CoONs. J. 407, 410, 420-21 (1978); Note, supra note 204, at 745-54;
Note, Promoting Recovery by Claimants in Iowa Malicious Prosecution Actions, 64 IowA
L. 1REv. 408 (1979).
207 See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 204, at 1022; Note, supra note 206, at 408; Note,
Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice Claims?, 26
CASE W. Rs. L. REV. 653, 678 (1976).
M8 See Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 40 S.E.2d 332, 337 (W. Va. 1946); W.
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scription of this prerequisite is similar to the negligence stan-
dard.m And while "malice" can be shown through hatred or ill-
will, it can also be inferred from a lack of probable cause. -2 10
Nonetheless, causes of action for malicious prosecution have
met with little success over the years, and are not favored by the
courts.2 11 At the heart of the unfavorable judicial disposition to-
ward this cause of action are two conflicting policy consider-
ations: (1) a desire to protect people from unwarranted and vex-
atious litigation and (2) a concern that individuals have ready ac-
cess to our court system for the redress of their grievances and
compensation for their injuries, and that their lawyers be able to
prosecute their clients' cause zealously and forcefully. 212
Malicious prosecution was long considered an aberrant cause
of action offering such little chance of success that practicing
PROSSER, supra note 20, §§ 119-20, at 841-47, 854.
209 The highest court in Kentucky has defined "probable cause" necessary to support
a malicious prosecution action arising out of a civil suit as follows: "[a]ll that is necessary
to establish 'probable cause' is to show that it [the plaintiff in the underlying proceeding]
reasonably believed it had a chance to win the original case." Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc.,
240 S.W.2d at 88. See Burt v. Smith, 73 N.E. 495, 496 (N.Y. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203
U.S. 129 (1906). '
210 See, e.g., Masterson v. Pig 'n Whistle Corp., 326 P.2d 918, 928 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958); Central Florida Mach. Co. v. Williams, 400 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); W.T. Grant Co. v. Taylor, 4 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ky. 1928); Nyer v. Carter, 367
A.2d 1375, 1378-79 (Me. 1977); Koury v. John Meyer of Norwich, 261 S.E.2d 217, 221
(N.C. App. 1980); Nagy v. McBarney, 392 A.2d 365, 367 (R.I. 1978). See also W. PROS-
s.t, supra note 20, § 120, at 855; R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 59.
211 See, e.g., Babb v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 379 (Cal. 1971); Berlin v. Nathan,
381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d at 899; Hill v.
Wilmott, 561 S.W.2d at 334; Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d 846, 847-48; Davis v. Brady, 291
S.W. at 412-13; North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 44 A.2d 441, 444 (Md. 1945); May-
flower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 83 A.2d 246, 253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951).
212 For a discussion of these conflicting considerations, see Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.
Supp. at 1376; Norton v. Hines, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 240-42; Ammerman v. Newman, 384
A.2d at 641; Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d at 1371-72; Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d at
334-35; Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d at 895; Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 83 A.2d at
296; O'Toole v. Franklin, 569 P.2d at 564.
Since a prior party's lawyer can also be held liable for malicious prosecution in
filing a groundless action,,the courts have expressed concern that too rigorous enforcement
of the policy against unfounded lawsuits will result in an unwillingness of lawyers to un-
dertake difficult, unpopular and complex matters because of a fear of retaliation in the
event the original cause proves unsuccessful. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 123 Cal. Rptr. at
237; Friedman v. Dozorc, 50 U.S.L.W. 2331 (Mich. Nov. 23, 1981). See Mallen, supra
note 206, at 409-10.
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lawyers hardly gave it any thought . 213 In recent years, however,
malicious prosecution and similar intentional torts such as abuse
of process have become a favorite of irate physicians who have
been the subject of unsuccessful medical malpractice suits.21 4
While a physician could also proceed against the original plain-
tiff in the medical malpractice litigation,215 it is the attorney who
represented the former patient, rather than the patient, who has
had to bear the brunt of these malicious prosecution counter-
suits. 21 6 Despite the popularity of such physicians' countersuits,
they have been almost uniformly unsuccessful other than as a de-
vice for retaliation and harassment. 21 7
Incensed physicians have also attempted to base their coun-
tersuits upon a negligence cause of action, which would be easier
to prove than malicious prosecution.218 Such efforts have been
uniformly futile because courts are unpersuaded that a lawyer
who brings suit on behalf of a client also owes a duty of care to
the party being sued. 2 9 One such fruitless effort can be found in
213 See, e.g., Mallen, supra note 206, at 408 ("in the history of American jurispru-
dence few former adversaries have been able to show that an attorney acted with malice
and without probable cause"); Note, supra note 207, at 678 ("The infrequency of actions
for malicious prosecution and their consistent lack of success indicates the difficulties con-
fronting the physician who pursues such a cause of action").
214 See R. MALLEN & V. LEviT. supra note 6, § 45, at 95-97; Birnbaum, supra note
204, at 1004.
215 In a suit against the plaintiff in a prior proceeding, that party may be able to as-
sert the advice-of-counsel defense-that the defendant in the malicious prosecution suit
was following the advice of his or her attorney in filing the original suit. This generally
will suffice to show the requisite "probable cause" to refute a charge of malicious prosecu-
tion. Alexander v. Alexander, 229 F.2d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 1956); Warner v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 178 F. Supp. 481 (M.D.N.C. 1959); Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d at
86; Lexington Cab Co. v. Terrell, 137 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1940); Weidlich v. Weidlich, 30
N.Y.S.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941); Johnson v. Moser, 72 P.2d 715 (Okla. 1937).
216 See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, § 45, at 95-98. But just as a client can
assert an advice-of-counsel defense, the attorney may be aided by showing that there was
reasonable reliance upon factual information provided by the client. Id. § 45, at 117-18.217 See the discussion of cases in C. KwNDaEcAN, supra note 28, at 25-27; R. MALLEte
& V. LEVWT, supra note 6, § 45.
218 E.g., Norton v. Hines, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 237; Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d at
331; Friedman v. Dozorc, 50 U.S.L.W. at 2331; Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763,770-
71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
219 According to a recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court: "Assuming that
an attorney has an obligation to his client to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to
bringing an action, that obligation is not the functional equivalent of a duty of care owed
to the client's adversary. Such a duty is inconsistent with basic precepts of the adversary
system." Friedman v. Dozorc, 50 U.S.L.W. at 2331.
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Hill v. Willmott,m° where the physician eschewed a cause of ac-
tion for malicious prosecution in favor of negligence. In affirm-
ing the trial court's dismissal of the physician's negligence action,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals set forth various policy reasons
for limiting the physician's recourse to a less-than-favored cause
of action for malicious prosecution and the more demanding
standard of proof required for establishing an attorney's lack of
"probable cause" for instituting the original suit.2 21 While con-
ceding that the same evidence that was offered to prove negli-
gence would also be material to the question of "probable cause"
in a malicious prosecution suit, the court in Willmott clearly
voiced its opinion that application of a lower negligence standard
in such countersuits would be disastrous.22 These statements in
Hill v. Willmott appear consistent with the law of malicious pro-
secution both as it has developed in Kentucky and as that cause of
action has existed in other jurisdictions in this country.
The Kentucky Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Raine v.
Drasin222 has abruptly altered the rationale of Hill v. Willmott
and the evolution of the law of malicious prosecution in Ken-
tucky. If for no other reason, the case is significant because it is
one of only a handful of appellate decisions involving counter-
suits which has affirmed a trial court's decision in favor of a phy-
sician.m But there is much more to.Raine v. Drasin that makes it
20 561 S.W.2d at 331.
221 In Hill, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated: "To allow a party to bring a negli-
gence action against the adverse attorney would have a chilling effect on the number of
meritorious claims filed and this cannot be tolerated under our system." Id. at 335.
Similarly, in Tool Research & Eng'g Corp. v. Henigson, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975), the California court said: "The key to the protection of the basic legal con-
cept allowing free access to the courts is the element of 'probable cause' in an action for
malicious prosecution. Any less demanding standard would make the attorney'... an in-
surer to his client's adversary that his client will win in litigation.'
= 561 S.W.2d at 335.
2 621 S.W.2d at 895.
22A Other than the Kentucky Supreme Court decisions in Raine v. Drasin and
Mahaffey v. McMahon, 630 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1982), only two decisions apparently have
been reported in which a physician's successful countersuit against an attorney who pre-
viously had brought a medical malpractice claim have been upheld on appeal. See Bull v.
McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980) (action for abuse of process upheld, including jury
verdict of $35,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages); Peerman v. Sidi-
cane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (malicious prosecution and abuse of process;
award of $3,000 in compensatory and $8,500 in exemplary damages upheld). See gen-
erally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT. supra note 6, § 45, at 95-98 & nn.57-58.
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noteworthy than just its ultimate holding.
The underlying suit in Raine v. Drasin was a medical mal-
practice action brought by a man named Browning, represented
by Raine and Highfield, against two doctors, Drasin and
Fadel.2 Browning had suffered a massive heart attack and had
been rushed to the emergency room of a local hospital. After his
release, Browning contacted Raine about the possibility of a suit
for an injury to his shoulder which had occurred during his hos-
pitalization. Raine drafted and filed the complaint against the
hospital, and thereafter prepared an amended complaint, which
joined Drs. Drason and Fadel as defendants. m
The problems with the amended complaint were that Drasin
was the radiologist who read the x-rays after Browning's shoulder
was fractured, and Fadel was an orthopedic surgeon who treated
the shoulder after it had been injured. The evidence indicated
that Raine knew or should have known that the two doctors
could not have been involved in causing the injury which formed
the basis of the medical malpractice suit because that fact was
evident from the hospital records that Raine had reviewed and
from testimony at a deposition given prior to the filing of the
amended complaint.22 Subsequently, when Raine was apprised
of these facts by the doctors' attorney, he agreed to dismiss the
action against them voluntarily. Raine's willingness to drop suit
against the doctors obviously did not appease them,m as they
22 Actually, Highfield only signed the complaint as an accommodation to Raine,
because Raine represented another hospital and preferred not to disclose his representation
of Browning. 621 S.W.2d at 898, 902-03.
M
9 Highfield also signed the amended complaint as an accommodation to Raine. Id.
2Id. at 898.
M As part of an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the
underlying suit brought against him or her had been terminated in his or her favor. W.
PROSSER, supra note 6, § 120, at 853-54. The Kentucky Supreme Court in Raine v. Drasin
held that the voluntary dismissal agreed to by the attorneys constituted a "favorable termi-
nation" so as to support the malicious prosecution action. 621 S.W.2d at 899-900.
The decision in Raine v. Drasin on this particular point may have some undesir-
able consequences. Although the attorney may properly be subject to criticism for his con-
duct in filing suit against two doctors who clearly were not involved in the alleged act of
malpractice, and this was known or should have been known by the attorney, the fact re-
mains that once opposing counsel brought these facts to the attorney's attention he imme-
diately filed an "agreed order of dismissal." Id. at 898-99. This aspect of the attorney's
conduct was laudable. Yet, if the attorney had insisted on a settlement before filing the
dismissal, he would have precluded a finding of favorable termination. See id. at 899-900;
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then filed suit for malicious prosecution and abuse of process,2,
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
At the conclusion of the countersuit, the jury awarded the
physicians $20,000 in compensatory and $30,000 in punitive
damages on their malicious prosecution claims. 0° On appeal, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of
the abuse of process claim and agreed with the award of compen-
satory damages against Raine. However, it reversed the trial
court's judgment against Highfield on the ground that the evi-
dence failed to establish that he lacked probable cause in filing
the medical malpractice suit.2 1' The punitive damages award
against Raine also was set aside, and that issue was remanded to
the lower court for retrial. 2 2
On discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court rein-
stated the award of punitive damages against Raine, and other-
wise affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, including
that court's approval of the compensatory damages award
against Raine and the dismissal of the action as to Highfield. z In
the process, however, the Supreme Court needlessly confused the
law in Kentucky on the nature of damages recoverable in a mali-
cious prosecution action, and quietly lowered the quantum of
proof necessary to establish a lack of "probable cause," so that
this element may be no more difficult to prove than negligence.
Even before Raine, it was not altogether clear whether Ken-
tucky, like the majority of states, allowed the recovery of general
W. PROSSER, supra note 6, §120, at 854. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that an attorney like
Raine will so readily agree in the future to such a voluntary dismissal, without the further
annoyance and delay of an agreed compromise or settlement.
229 An action for "abuse of process" arises when someone makes use of a legal process
or procedure for an improper purpose, causing damage to another. Lack of probable cause
need not be established, nor does the plaintiff have to show that the underlying action ter-
minated in favor of the original defendant. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 6 § 121,
at 856-58; Birnbaum, supra note 204, at 1033-42.
230 More precisely, the jury returned a verdict of $5,000 for pain and suffering and
$5,000 for humiliation and loss of reputation in favor of each physician, as well as grant-
ing each $15,000 in punitive damages. The total verdict of $50,000 was apportioned by
the jury, with $37,500 allocated against defendant Raine and $12,500 against Highfield.
621 S.W.2d at 899.
231 Id. at 898.
2 2 Id.
233 Id. at 903. But see the dissenting opinion by Justice Lukowsky. Id. at 903-06.
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damages in a malicious prosecution action based upon a prior
civil suit, or whether, as has generally been assumed, it followed
the "English" rule requiring a showing of "special injury" before
damages arising from a civil prosecution could be awarded.m
Simply stated, the "special injury" rule requires the defendant in
the original action to show that he incurred an injury and dam-
age other than that generally suffered by defendants in similar
litigation.235
The Court of Appeals' decision in Raine v. Drasin seemed to
concede that the "special injury" requirement applied in Ken-
tucky; the court upheld the award of such damages after finding
that the allegations in the original medical malpractice com-
plaint were libelous per se and, thus, had "assailed" the physi-
234 Woods v. Finnell, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 628 (1878), established the rule in Kentucky
governing recovery of damages for malicious prosecution. The Court said:
It must appear that the action was founded in malice, instituted without
probable cause, and that the plaintiff has been damaged.
When the reputation has not been assailed, or the defendant im-
prisoned, or his property seized, or its use prevented, the damages should be
confined to the loss of time, and the reasonable expenses incurred in the de-
fense of the action beyond the ordinary costs.
Id. at 633-34. See Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d at 903-04 (Lukowsky, J., dissenting).
In Smith v. Smith, 178 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Ky. 1944), the Court indicated a prefer-
ence for the English "special damage" rule, and stated that it had been adopted in Ken-
tucky in Woods v. Finnell. Seven years later, the Court made a similar statement but with
somewhat less conviction: "The rule [as to damages] seems to be that the institution of a
civil suit maliciously and without probable cause is a sufficient basis for an action for mali-
cious prosecution where one has suffered special damages." Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc.,
240 S.W.2d at 86.
In O'Toole v. Franklin, the Oregon Supreme Court listed 17 American jurisdic-
tions that follow the English rule restricting damages, and 23 states that impose no condi-
tions on the recovery of damages in malicious prosecution actions. 569 P.2d at 564 nn. 3 &
4. Kentucky was listed as one of the jurisdictions following the strict English rule. Id. See
also Note, supra note 207, at 657; Note, supra note 206, at 413; Note, supra note 204, at
748. One student commentator has argued persuasively that Kentucky has been incorrect-
ly designated as following the English or "special injury" rule, derived from a misreading
of Woods v. Finnell. See Note, Malicious Prosecution Liability of Plaintiffs Counsel For
an Unwarranted Medical Malpractice Suit-New Developments in Physician Counter-
suits for Unfounded Medical Malpractice Claims-Raine v. Drasin, 7 No. KY. L. REV.
265, 281-83 (1980). There is much to be said for this latter position, based upon a close
reading of Woods v. Finnell, which appears to reject the English position.
235 See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. at 1379; Ammerman v. Newman, 384
A.2d at 641; O'Toole v. Franklin, 569 P.2d at 563-64. See generally R. MALLEN & V.
LEVIT, supra note 6, at 60.
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cians' reputations.2 6 The Supreme Court, on the other hand,
brushed aside the Court of Appeals' finding which permitted re-
covery of special damages2 37 It then proceeded to allow the same
damages as compensation for the "humiliation, mortification
and loss of reputation" the physicians suffered, without ex-
plaining how such damages could be recovered if Kentucky, as
generally believed, requires a showing of special injury. In fact,
no other jurisdiction following the "special injury" rule appears
to have allowed damages for such things as humiliation and loss
of reputation2sa The ambiguous nature of the Supreme Court's
holding in Raine on the issue of recoverable damages in a mali-
cious prosecution cause of action is all the more inexcusable be-
cause this question had specifically been raised on appeal: "Since
there was no showing of special damages, was the award of other
compensatory damages proper?"240 Now, as a result of the deci-
sion in Raine v. Drasin, the law in Kentucky on the recovery of
damages in a malicious prosecution action is confused and uncer-
tain.
236 The Court of Appeals discussed Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d at 86,
and considered whether the physicians were "assailed" by the earlier medical malpractice
suit as that term was used in Harter. 621 S.W.2d at 900. The Court of Appeals then anal-
ogized the requirement for an "assailed" reputation to the provision of the Restatement of
Torts allowing recovery of damages in a malicious prosecution action if the claimant suf-
fered damages to his reputation by an allegation which was defamatory. Id. at 901.
237 The Supreme Court stated:
It is not necessary to decide, as did the Court of Appeals, whether the allega-
tions in the complaint were libelous. The accusation of negligence in the ex-
ercise of one's profession certainly can produce mortification, humiliation,
injury to the reputation, character and health, mental suffering, and gen-
eral impairment of social and mercantile standing, all of which are elements
of damage in a malicious prosecution action. H.S. Leyman Co. v. Short,
Ky., 283 S.W. 96 (1926). The award of compensatory damages is affirmed.
621 S.W.2d at 900.
M Id. The Supreme Court's reliance in Raine v. Drasin upon H.S. Leyman Co. v.
Short, 283 S.W. 96 (Ky. 1926) for the award of damages for such things as humiliation
and loss of reputation was clearly misplaced. While Leyman clearly authorizes damages
for such injuries, the malicious prosecution in that case was posited on a prior criminal ac-
tion. 283 S.W. at 98. The "English" or "special injury" rule which places substantial re-
strictions on the recovery of such damages in a malicious prosecution case is applicable
only in situations in which the underlying action was civil not criminal. R. MALtN' & V.
LEVIT, supra note 6, § 46; W. PROSSER, supra note 20 § 119, at 849-50.
23' See, e.g., the cases cited in note 234 supra; R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6,
§60.
240 621 S.W.2d at 900.
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Equally confusing and significant is the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Raine v. Drasin relating to the proof required to show
lack of probable cause. In Hill v. Willmott,2A' the court had re-
fused to permit a countersuit to be based upon an easier to prove
negligence standard and, instead, insisted that such a claimant
seek relief through the malicious prosecution cause of action. 4 2
In Raine v. Drasin, however, the Supreme Court impliedly
lowered the standard for showing lack of probable cause, so that
the requisite proof appeared to be no more than would be neces-
sary to establish negligence on the part of the attorneys in initial-
ly filing suit. This relaxation of the "probable cause" requirement
can be seen in at least two separate aspects of the decision. First,
the principal evidence of lack of probable cause came from the
testimony of a member of the Louisville Bar Association's ethics
committee who opined that the defendant-lawyers "did not com-
ply with the standard of care for ordinary and prudent law-
yers."2 3 This is identical to the type of evidence that would be of-
fered to prove negligence in a legal malpractice action. 4 Second-
ly, in spite of the fact that malicious prosecution is an intentional
tort, the trial court's instructions to the jury were needlessly con-
fused with allusions to negligence so that negligence seemed to be
emphasized more than probable cause or any other element of
malicious prosecution. 5
The Court of Appeals at least expressed its concern about this
problem, but went on to hold that although the instructions were
improper, they were not prejudicial to the appellants. 46 In up-
holding those same instructions, replete as they were with refer-
ences to negligence, the Supreme Court found "neither error nor
prejudice" to the attorney-appellants.2 7 Moreover, slackening
the requirement for proving lack of probable cause is all the more
241 561 S.W.2d at 331.
22 id. at 334-35.
23 621 S.W.2d at 901.
244 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d at 935-56; Lysick v. Wolcom, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 413-15; Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d at 17-18; Hill v. Wilmott, 561
S.W.2d at 333-34; Woody v. Mudd, 265 A.2d 458, 464 (Md. 1970); Citizens Bank of
Dickinson v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375,386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
245 621 S.W.2d at 901-02.
216 Id. at 902.
247 Id.
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startling when it is realized that "malice," one of the other essen-
tial elements in a case of action for malicious prosecution, can be
inferred from an absence of probable cause. 248
Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Raine v.
Drasin is significant for a number of reasons. As noted, it is one of
the first reported appellate decisions upholding a physician's ma-
licious prosecution countersuit against a lawyer who had pre-
viously sued the physician for medical malpractice. It has also
apparently liberalized the law on damages in malicious prosecu-
tion actions, so that there no longer seem to be any restraints on
the amount or nature of compensation recoverable in such a
cause of action in Kentucky. And, finally, the Supreme Court
seems to have relaxed its requirement for a showing of a lack of
probable cause, leaving the impression that the necessary proof is
similar to what would be required to establish negligence in a
legal malpractice suit. Although malicious prosecution actions
were clearly not favored in Kentucky, 24 9 that statement can no
longer be made after Raine v. Drasin.
Many observers undoubtedly believed that the Kentucky Su-
preme Court had simply overstated its position in Raine v. Dra-
sin, and that matters would be brought back into perspective
when the Court had another opportunity to review a malicious
prosecution case on appeal. Quite the opposite has occurred. On
March 30, 1982, the Supreme Court decided another physician's
malicious prosecution countersuit, Mahaffey v. McMahon,5
and, if nothing else, the decision in this latest case is a clear indi-
cation that the Court has not backed down from its earlier hold-
ing in Raine v. Drasin. Furthermore, any doubt about the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court's lowering of the "probable cause" require-
ment also appears to have been put to rest. The fears among
members of the bar precipitated by Raine v. Drasin were, as it
turns out, well justified.
In Mahaffey, a woman suffering from abdominal pains un-
derwent surgery which disclosed bladder and liver problems. Al-
248 See note 211 supra for a list of authorities on this point.
249 See, e.g., Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d at 334; Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d at 847-
48; Davis v. Brady, 291 S.W. at 412-13.
250 630 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1982).
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most a year later, the patient retained the services of an attorney,
McMahon, who filed a medical malpractice suit on her behalf
against the surgeon, Mahaffey, on the ground that the surgery
was not necessary. Apparently, the allegation that the surgery
was not required had no basis other than the patient's own con-
clusion, and summary judgment was granted dismissing the mal-
practice claim."5' The surgeon then filed a malicious prosecution
action against his former patient and her lawyer, and when the
former defaulted, the case proceeded against the attorney
alone. 0 2
The trial court in the countersuit directed a verdict in favor
of the lawyer because the surgeon had failed to establish a lack of
probable cause in the filing of the original medical malpractice
action.' -" On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court unanimously
reversed, holding that the physician had made out a prima facie
case of lack of probable cause by his testimony concerning his
treatment of the patient 5 ' In essence, the Supreme Court held
that an attorney lacks "probable cause" in filing a medical mal-
practice suit if he or she does not have, prior to filing, expert
medical opinion as to the existence of malpractice, unless the
doctor's mistake is so plain and comprehensible that no expert
testimony would be necessary to get the case to a jury.2 15 In
251 Id. at 69.
2 52 Id.
2 Id.
2s4 The Kentucky Supreme Court's conclusion on the probable cause issue was un-
doubtedly influenced to some extent by the defendant-attorney's conduct at trial. In an ef-
fort to undercut plaintiff-physician's proof of an absence of probable cause, at the instiga-
tion of the defendant-attorney, both the attorney and his client in the underlying medical
malpractice suit invoked the attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure of what the
client had told the attorney about the medical treatment prior to filing of the original suit.
Because it felt that such evidence was essential for the physician to prove lack of probable
cause, the trial court directed a verdict in the attorney's favor, and that ruling was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals. Id. But the Supreme Court responded differently: "We
feel that this is a perversion of the doctrine of the [attorney-client] privilege." Id. The Su-
preme Court then went on to hold that the burden of proof on the issue of lack of probable
cause could be met by the plaintiff-physician's testimony alone. Id. at 69-70.
2 55 In the original medical malpractice action, summary judgment was granted
against the patient for failure to offer expert testimony on the malpractice issue. 630
S.W.2d at 70. While recognizing that such medical testimony was not always necessary
(e.g., when, to use the Court's illustration, the wrong leg was amputated), the Court be-
lieved that such testimony was essential to determine whether the abdominal surgery was
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Mahaffey, expert testimony was required to get the issue of whe-
ther surgery was a necessary procedure to the jury. Thus, neither
the patient nor the attorney had "probable cause" to file suit
since they did not have the benefit of expert medical advice.25
If anything, Mahaffey v. McMahon compounds the problems
which first appeared in Raine v. Drasin, and makes a physician's
countersuit a viable cause of action because of the relative ease of
proving a lack of probable cause. In innumerable medical mal-
practice claims, subject to a short statute of limitations,2 it may
be virtually impossible to secure a medical opinion before suit is
filed, although it is anticipated that such an expert will be lo-
cated before the trial. Now, as a result of the Supreme Court's in-
explicable analogy between proof of blatant medical malpractice
where expert testimony is not required and the type of case that
can safely befiled without the favorable opinion of an expert,2 a
necessary. Id. The Court concluded:
It appears that in this case, involving abdominal surgery with a normal re-
covery, it would be highly unlikely that any lay opinion or recitation of facts
by a layman would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of probable cause
in the absence of some medical testimony to buttress the claim that the oper-
ation on Hoskins performed by movant was an unnecessary surgical proce-
dure.
Id.
And while the Supreme Court did not say so directly, if an attorney filed suit
prior to obtaining a medical opinion supporting the malpractice claim, expecting to obtain
such an expert witness at a later date, and then failed to locate such an expert, that action
would leave the attorney open to a subsequent malicious prosecution countersuit, even if
the attorney agreed to a dismissal immediately upon determining that such an expert
could not be located. See Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d at 895.
256 630 S.W.2d at 70.
25 See, e.g., KRS § 413.140(1)(e) & (2) (Supp. 1980) (one-year statute applies to a
medical malpractice claim unless that period is extended by reason of application of the
"discovery" rule).
M The Court's decision in Mahaffey v. McMahon completely overlooks two clearly
justifiable instances in which an attorney should not be exposed to a malicious prosecution
countersuit when a medical malpractice action is filed without a medical expert's favor-
able opinion. First, if the statute is about to run on a medical malpractice claim, time may
not permit the securing of such an opinion prior to filing of the complaint. But if suit were
not filed for this reason, and the limitations period were allowed to run, an attorney
would clearly be liable to the client for legal malpractice. Secondly, if the attorney was ex-
perienced in handling medical malpractice suits, he or she could well have sufficient ex-
pertise to make a decision as to whether a cause of action was tenable without an expert
medical opinion prior to filing suit. Such an attorney should not, by reason of such action,
be subject to a malicious prosecution countersuit.
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lawyer will often act at his or her own peril if a suit is brought be-
fore securing a medical expert. At this point, the medical profes-
sion in Kentucky appears to be winning its judicial battle with
lawyers, but the real losers may be medical malpractice claim-
ants who have valid cause for complaint but who may encounter
some difficulty locating an attorney willing to represent them. 59
As malicious prosecution has become a more feasible cause of
action, the chance of recovering punitive damages against law-
yers also has increased. In a legal malpractice action, such exem-
plary damages cannot be recovered unless it is shown that the at-
torney's conduct constituted fraud or some comparable type of
willful misconduct.2w In contrast, a successful cause of action for
malicious prosecution necessarily involves a finding that the de-
fendant was motivated by "malice," and award of punitive dam-
ages is not unusual in such cases.2A5 In Raine v. Drasin, for exam-
ple, $30,000 of the $50,000 awarded by the jury represented
punitive damages.2 2 Thus, as a consequence of the Supreme
Court's lenient treatment of physicians' malicious prosecution
countersuits, Kentucky lawyers may be liable for punitive dam-
ages which, for all practical purposes, did not represent much of
a risk in legal malpractice suits. 26
259 Unwittingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court has broken new ground by its implicit
holding in Mahaffey v. McMahon that a lack of probable cause to support a malicious pro-
secution suit can be established when a medical malpractice suit is filed without benefit of
expert medical opinion. By way of contrast, one reported decision directly on point held,
after considerable discussion, that the failure to interview witnesses or to obtain compe-
tent medical advice does not establish "malice" for purposes of a malicious prosecution
suit. Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d at 596. Other cases similarly support the position that
an attorney does not have to obtain a favorable expert opinion before initiating suit. See
Ammerman v. Newman, 354 A.2d at 637; Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d at 1367. Further,
the commentators who have specifically addressed this point uniformly appear to support
the position set forth in Spencer v. Burglass. See Birnbaum, supra note 204, at 1018-19,
1028-30; Mallen, supra note 206, at 417; Note, supra note 207, at 680.
260 See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr. supra note 6, § 315.
21 See, e.g., Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d at 957 (physician's countersuit: jury award
of $35,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages upheld); Peerman v. Sidi-
cane, 605 S.W.2d at 242 ($3,000 in compensatory and $8,500 in punitive damages in phy-
sician's countersuit). See also Richards v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Cal. App.
1978); W. PnossEn, supra note 6, § 119, at 550.
262 621 S.W.2d at 898-99.
263 In Kentucky, at least, attorneys should review their professional liability insur-
ance policies to determine what coverage, if any, is provided for malicious prosecution li-
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As the popularity of malicious prosecution countersuits has
escalated, an ironic twist has occurred. Attorneys are now begin-
ning to resort to this cause of action in retaliation for legal mal-
practice suits brought by former clients.2 4 It is certainly conceiv-
able that such attorney countersuits will discourage the institu-
tion of legal malpractice suits, even those that have merit, just as
the medical profession believes that physicians' countersuits will
have a dampening effect on medical malpractice claims. While
the attorney countersuit has yet to surface in Kentucky, the Su-
preme Court's recent decisions in Raine and Mahaffey liberaliz-
ing the malicious prosecution cause of action in suits brought by
doctors may well pave the way for similar successes by irate at-
torneys.
CONCLUSION
The dichotomy in judicial treatment in Kentucky between
claims against attorneys based upon malpractice and counter-
suits posited on malicious prosecution may be more apparent
than real. Courts in this state have not been in the forefront of
the dramatic changes that have occurred in the law of legal mal-
practice in the last decade or two, and the decisions rendered
during this period have generally upheld lower court determina-
tions in favor of defendant-attorneys. Yet in recent years, the ap-
pellate courts in Kentucky have issued strong and unequivocal
statements that indicate a judicial attitude favoring increased at-
torney accountability for professional negligence.
On the other hand, the state inexplicably appears to be on
the cutting edge of the law of malicious prosecution as applied in
physicians' countersuits against attorneys. Two recent Kentucky
Supreme Court decisions have upheld such causes of action in sit-
ability. While such policies generally insure attorneys against claims arising from the ren-
dering of "professional services," such policies often contain a "fraud" exclusion which
may apply to malicious as well as fraudulent acts, and may exclude from coverage any li-
ability for punitive damages. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, §§ 707 & 718.
'4 See Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 1979); Lasswell v. Ehrlich, 416
N.E.2d 423 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981). While only a few cases are reported at the present time,
two highly respected commentators have indicated that malicious prosecution counter-
suits are being pursued today as vigorously by attorneys as by physicians. R. MALLEN & V.
LEVIT, supra note 6, at 345; Mallen, supra note 206, at 408.
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uations where courts in most other jurisdictions have proceeded
much more cautiously, to the benefit of the defendant-attorneys.
But the two decisions are not particularly intelligible or well-
reasoned, and the suspicion lingers that the Court has inadver-
tently extended the law of malicious prosecution in countersuits
against attorneys and will, before too long, clarify its position
and return to the judicial mainstream. Even so, there is no ques-
tion that this jurisdiction has seen and will continue to see an in-
crease in accountability by attorneys to their clients and to other
third parties adversely affected by their actions.

